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Statement of the problem. Among the most
influential German philosophers, Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) and Friedrich ITietzsche (1844-1900)
have usually been regarded as contradicting each
other in almost every principle of thought. The
purpose of this dissertation is to inquire into
the truth of this seeming contrast, and, if possible,
to show the relp.tions between these tv»'o men.
Importance of the study, llany people are
overcome with horror by the mere mention of I'lietzsche'
s
name. Host of them associate him with ruthless v;ar-
fare, anarchy, oppression, supermen, violence, and
atheism. Yet, very few people have any insight into
the ideals which guided his life and for which he
fought in his writings. Much damage has been done
\)y superficial reading and by prejudiced interpretation.
His poetical language makes it difficult to understand
his principles, but this handicap does not excuse the
fact tha.t no attempt has ever been made to compare

Nietzsche's maturest ideas with those of the master raind
of Kant.
The work of previous investigators. No study of
the relations of Friedrich Nietzsche to Immanuel Kant
has ever heen published, as far as can "be ascertained.
Among the many successful interpretations of Kant's
writings those of E, Caird, F. Paulsen, and K. Voriander
deserve special mention. N.K. Smith's and H, Cohen's
commentaries to the KrV are still unsurpassed. H. Vai-
hinger has done the most extensive work in bringing out
the negative sides of the philosophies of "both Kant and
Nietzsche. Among the few objective interpretations of
Nietzsche's writings, the work of ¥.M. Salter is note-
worthy. G.B. Foster is non-committal concerning major
issues and ¥• Burant overemphasizes Nietzsche's
achievements. S. "Bertram's and H. Ellis's psychological
studies of Nietzsche are valuable for an understanding
of Nietzsche's inconsistencies. Elisabeth Fflrster-
Nietzsche's biography of Nietzsche is interesting but
not sufficiently objective. Students of Nietzsche are
very much indebted to J.N. Figgis, H. Ilann, and W.M.

Salter for having paved the way to a more sympathetic
reception of ilietzsche by pointing out his truly
permanent ideas. L, Lichtenherger is the most prominent
French interpreter of ITietzsche's philosophy.
Scope of the study. The dissertation is the
direct result of a careful study of the works of Kant
and ITietzsche. Ho'^vever secondary'- source material is
consulted and listed in the "bihliography.
Uethod of procedure. After having stated the
explicit references to Kant in Nietzsche's writings,
which will demonstrate the actual hostility "between
the two philosophers, the investigation will proceed
according to Hegel's method of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis. In each chapter, Kant's ideas will
represent the thesis, ]*Tietzsche» s the antithesis.

and the Result of the Invest ip-ation villi be the
synthesi s.
References to Kant in Nietzsche.
1. Tlietzsche concec'ed that Kant was successful in
overcoming Leihnizian optimism:
Der ungeheuren Tapferkeit und Teisheit
Kants und Schopenhauers ist der schwerste
Si eg gelungen, der Si eg tOoer den im We sen
der Logik verborgen liegenden Optiraismus,
der wiederum der Untergrund unserer Kultur
ist. GdT,18.
Erinnem v/ir uns sodann, wie dem aus
gleichen 3,uellen str^menden Geiste der
deutschen Philosophie, durch Kant und
Schopenhauer, es ermflglicht war, die
zufriedne Daseinslust der '."ri ssenschaft-
lichen Sokratik, durch den ITachv/eis
ihrer Grenzen, zu vernichten. GdT, 19.
2. ^Tietzsche criticized the Kantian argument for
the existence of God:
Lange vor Kant und seinem kategori schen
Imperativ hatte Luther aus derselhen
Srapfindung gesagt: es rniJlsse ein Tfesen geben,
dem der Ilensch unhedingt vertrauen kiJnne,--
es war sein Gottesheweis, er T.'-ollte, grflher
und volkst*lmlicher als Kant, dass man nicht
einem J^egriff , soncern einer Person
unhedingt gehorche; und schliesslich hat
auch Kant seinen TTmweg um die Moral nur
deshalb genoramen, um zura Gehorsam gegen
die Person zu gelangen. LfOR,III,207.
3, ;^"ietzsche called Kant^s thing in itself
ridiculous and accused him of returning to God,
11
the soul, freedom, and immortality:
Ich gedenke c'abei res alten ICant, der zur
Strafe daf<lr, dass er „ das Ding an sich"--
auch eine sehr l^cherliche Sachel— sich
erschlichen hatte, vom „lcategorischen
Imperativ" "beschlichen v/urde und rait ihm
im Herzen sich wieder zu ,, Gott" „ Seele"
„ Freiheit" und „ Unsterblichkeit" zuriUck-
verirrte, einem Fuchse gleich, der sich
in seinen Kftfig zurflckverirrt :—und seine
Kraft und Klugheit war es ge'.-resen, -y/elche
diesen K^fig erbrochen hattel FJ,IV,335.
4. Nietzsche called Kant the great Chinese of
KiJnigsherg because he had walled himself within
artificial structures:
Auch der grosse Chinese von Kflnigsherg
war nur ein grosser Kritiker. JGB,rv,210.
5. ITietzsche called the Kantia.n categorical
imperative naive:
Die ^,ltere Moral, namentlich die Kants,
verlangt vom Einzelnen Handlungen, welche
man von illen Menschen wflnscht: das war
eine schdne naive Sache; als ob ein jeder
ohne weiteres wtisste, bei welcher Hand-
lungsweise das Ganze der Menschheit wohl-
fahre, also welche Handlungen tlberhaupt
wtfnschenswert seien. MA, 25.
6. ITietzsche attacked Kant* s critique of the
faculty of knowledge and his argument for the
existence of God on moral grounds:
Gewiss ist, dass alle Art Tran szend en-
tali sten seit Kant wieder gewonnenes
Spiel haben,--sie sind von den Theologen
emanzipiert: welches Gl<ickl--er hat ihnen
jenen Schleichweg verraten, auf dem sie
nunmehr auf eigne Faust und mit dem
best en wi ssenschaft lichen Anstande den
„ '.Tiilnschen ihres Herzens" nachgehn dtlrfen.
ZGK,III,25.

7. ITietzsche accused Kant of preaching the
separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, and
wiil:
Goethe. , ."bekampfte das Auseinander von
Vernunft, Sinnlichkei t , Gefiilhl, V/ille
(--in alDschreckendster Scholastik durch
Kant gepredigt, den Antipooen Goethes).
GD,49.
8. TTietzsche termed the Kantian categorical
imperative cruel:
dSellDst heim alten Kant nichti der
kategorische Imperativ riecht nach
Gre.usajnkeit , . . ) . ZGIsI,II,6.
9. ITietzsche called the Kantian thing in itself
a changeling:
(Das Atom ist zum Bei spiel ein solcher
V/echselhalg, insgleichen das Kantische
„ Ding an sich"). ZGII,I,13.
10. ^'''ietzsche called Kant a trea.cherous Christian
"because he distinguished betv^een a real and a
phenomenal world:
Die Telt scheiden in eine wahre" und
eine scheinhare" , sei es in der Art
des Chri stentums, sei es in der Art
Kants (eines hint erli stigen Christen zu
guter Letzt-- ) ist nur eine Suggestion
der decadence, --ein Symptom niedergehen-
den Lebens. CD, Die „ Vernunft" in der
Philosophic, 10, 4. sentence.
11. ITietzsche branded Kant as a concept-cripple:
Jenen ver^r/achsensten Begriff s-KrT!}ppel
,
den es je gegehen hat, den grossen Kant,
GD, 1Ib.s den Deutschen abgeht, 7.
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12. TIiet7.sch.e cynically remarked that Kant's
philosophy p;ives the highest title to the state
official:
„ V/elche Philosophic gi^bt die hflchste
Formel f«r den Staat s-?>e8jnten? —Die
Kants: der Staat s-Beajnte als Ding an
sich zum Richter ^esetzt ii\>eT den Staats-
Beamten als Erscheinung. GD, Streifztlge
eines Fnzeitgemassen , 29.
13. '^'ietzsche considered Kant's success only that
of a theologian:
Der Erfolg Kants ist bloss ein Theologen-
Erfolg: Kant war, gleich Luther, gleich
Leihniz, ein Hemmschuh mehr in der an sich
nicht taktfesten deutschen Rechtschaffen-
heit, A?TT,10.
Auch Kant, mit seinem kategori schen
Imperativ, wb,t auf dem gleichen \7ege:
seine Vernunft wurde -oraktisch. AITT,55;
cf. 61.
14. TTietzsche did not include Kant in his concept
of a tnze philosopher:
Y/ie ich den Philosophen verstehe, als
einen furchtharen Explosionsstoff , vor
dera alles in (Jefahr ist, wie ich raeinen
Begriff „ Philosoph" nieilenweit alDtrenne
von einera Begriff, der sogar noch einen
Ka.nt in sich schliesst. Eh, Die TJnzeit-
gemAssen, 3,
15. Fietzsche accused Kant of having preferred
the need of the heart instead of reason:
Zuletzt hat noch Ka.nt in aller Fnschuld
diese Denkerkorruptlon mit dem Begriff
„ praktische Vernunft" zu verwissenschaft-
lichen gesucht: er erfand eigens eine
Vernunft daftlr, in welchen Fallen man sich

11
urn die Vernunft zu kflramern "brauche; ndmlich
wenn das Bedtlrfnis des Herzens, wenn die
Moral, wenn die „ Pflicht" redet, ¥zM, 115.
16. Fietzsche claimed that Kant's, Hegel's and
Schopenhauer's insights are of moral origin:
Grundeinsi cht; sov-^ohl Kant, als Hegel,
als Schopenhauer. .. sind moralischen
Ursprungs. ¥zM,119.
17. ?Tietzsche rejected the Kantian sense of
ca.usality:
Es giht nicht, wie Kant meint, einen
Kausalit^ltssinn. WzM,248.
18. ITietzsche asserted that Kant with his moral
fanaticism is outside the historical movement:
Kant, rait seiner prakti schen Vernunft",
mit seinem Moral-Fanatismus ist ganz 18.
Jahrhundert; noch vflllig ausserhalTD der
hi stori schen Bewegung. ¥zM, 5.
19. l?ietzsche termed Kant a scare crow:'
Kant ist eine Vogelscheuche, irgend-
wann einmal! "FzM, 47.
20. Hietzsche claimed that for Kant everything is
merely appearance, including man:
Kflnnte das nicht alles nur Schein sein?
Und der Mensch trotz ailed em, mit Kant
zu red en. '^lfzM,84.
These severely critical passages demonstrate
Nietzsche's hostility to Kant. The following chapters
undertake to determine whether the antagonism "between




THE MORAL GOHCEPTIONS OF KALTT AND KIETZSGHE
In his moral feelings Kant always remained faith-
ful to the circle of humhle people from whom he had
come.^ His morality expressed the mode of life and of
thought in which he grew up. It v/as that plain and
simple life of the common man. ITietzsche, on the
other hand, "boasted of having sprung from Polish notility^
whose aristocratic principles he more or less consistently
proclaimed. The moral conceptions of these two philosophers
will "be expounded in this chapter,
1. THE MORAL CONCEPTIONS OF KANT
Horalit;r and its purpose. For Kant the aim of life
is consistent action and. not merely contemplation, Ke
assigned to the will the position in the world that
properly belongs to it and thus put an end to one-sided
intellectual ism,^ The free and rational will of man is
the only foundation for moral principles.
*Vorl«lnder, 11,1,295.





Die Autonomie des Willens ist das alleinige
Princip aller moralischen Gesetze.5
Woraus dann folgt, dass eine Person keinen
anderen Gesetzen als denen, die sie.,.sich
selTost gilDt, unterworfen ist. 6
Tugend ist also die raoralische Starke des
Willens eines Menschen in Befolgung seiner
Pflicht.7
Thus Kant refutes the alDstract ways of thinking® and is
quite practical. Morality must he regarded as ohject-
ively valid because man actually recognizes himself as
q
a, being endowed ^'.'ith reason and vrill. This fact con-
tains the possibility of a universal legislation.
The home of morality is the realm of the pure
practical reason or freedom. Yet freedom consists in
not being determined by external things. "^^ Hence the
moral law is not imposed on us by some external power.
It is true that the moral law is the will of God, but
in the moral act the will of God and the will of man









What then is the purpose of morality? Kant replies,
to establish laws of conduct that are recognized as
binding by all free and rational beings. Because of
their universality these laws are necessarily formal. "^"^
Wenn ein vern^lnftiges ¥esen sich seine
Maximen als praktische allgeraeine Gesetze
denken soil, so kann es sich dieselben nur
als solche Principien denken, die nicht
der Materie, sondem bloss der Form nach
den Bestiramungsgrund des Willens enthalten.-^^
The meaning of good and bad.. If the moral agent
is the acting person, it is plain that the terms good
and bad can be applied only to the actions of rational
persons and not to things.
Das Gute Oder BdJse bedeutet aber jederzeit
eine Beziehung auf den ¥illen, sofern dieser
durchs Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird, sich
etwas zu seinem Objekte zu machen.13
Things cannot be good or bad. There is nothing in the
v/orld nor outside of it that can be called good except
a good will.
Ss ist Uberall nicht s in der Welt, ja
tflberhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken
raiJglich, v/as ohne SinschrM,nkung fflr gut







The Categorical Imperative. The moral law ought
to "be "binding for every rational creature. Consequently
•we must derive it from reason whose essence is alDSolute
universality and necessity. Therefore, if the maxim of
the vrill cannot he performed "by all men, it is not
moral. This categorical imperative is essentially the
same as the Golden Rule in the Sermon on the Mount.
Taking all mankind into account, it declares that the
law of conduct ought to he one that I could wish every
human "being to adopt.
Handle so, als o'b die Maxirae deiner Hand-
lung durch deinen Willen zura allgemeinen
ITaturgesetze werden sollte.^S
Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens
jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allge-
meinen Gesetzge"bung gelten kiJnne.16
The categorical imperative is therefore a rational
principle 7;hich originates in the free will of man.
Dieses ist der Begriff der Preiheit,
und das von dieser a"bstammende Gesetz des
kategorischen , d.i. schlechthin gehietenden
Imperativs.l7
If a man permits himself to he ruled "by his sensibility,






the v/ill o'bey the comraands of reason. \7e are free to do
what we ought to do. The moral law does not compel, hut
hinds; hence it implies freedom. Although we cannot
prove freedom theoretically, it is not in the least
douhtful to the will. It is an immediate fact of the
moral consciousness.
Also drT!lckt das raoralische Gesetz nichts
anderes aus als die Autonomic der reinen
praktischen Vernunft, d.i. der Preiheit,
und diese ist selhst die formale Bedingung
aller Maocimen, unter der sie allein rait
dem ohersten praktischen Gesetzen zusammen-
stimmen kflnnen.lS
The voice of conscience. ¥hen Kant speaks of
duty as a sublime and great name before which all our
inclinations become silent, even though they secretly
19
work against it, one might interpret it as a unique
fact that looms above us like a mysterious apparition.
But that is not what Kant means by duty or the voice
of conscience. He clearly states that conscience or
duty is practical reason.
Gewissen ist die dem Menschen in jedem
Fall eines Gesetzes seine Pflicht zura Los-








Pflicht: welche eine moralische N<3tigung
durch seine eigene gesetzgebende Vernunft
ist,22
If we make reason subservient to sensuous
desires and deny the possibility of a disinterested
act, we destroy genuine morality. Acts are morally
good only if they are done \vith rational consistency
?/ithout predilection.^^
Das moralische Gesetz verlangt Befolgung
aus Pflicht, nicht aus Vorliebe, die man
gar nicht voraussetzen kann und soil. 24
Das Wesentliche alles sittlichen Werts
der Handlungen kommt darauf an, dass das
moralische Gesetz unmittelbar den Willen
bestirame. 25
The fiat justitia ruat coelum is a direct duty
of the Kantian ethics. Obey the commands of the moral
law without regard for consequencesi If Kant is not
interested in consequences why does he make it a maxim
that every man ought to act in reference to posterity
that men may always become better? His interest in
consequences lies at the very basis of his moral











immortality the glorious ideas of morality, although
objects of approlDation and of admiration, could not
loe springs of purpose and action. The Categorical
Imperative also expresses great interest in consequences;
for its question is, v;hat would happen if everyone
would act as the acting person does. Its very
universality presupposes consideration of consequences.
Although Kant demands truthfulness by all mea^ns, he
was his own judge as to the extent of his frankness.
Wahrhaftigkei t im Inneren des Gestftndnisses
vor sich selbst und zugleich ira Betra.gen
gegen jeden anderen, sich zur obersten
Ilaxime gemacht, ist der einzige Beweis des
Bewusstseins eines Menschen, dass er einen
Charakter hat, 26
Zwar denke ich Vieles mit der allerklarsten
Ueberzeugung und zu meiner grossen Zufrieden-
heit, was ich niemals den Mut haben werde zu
sagen; niemals aber werde ich etv.as sagen,
was ich nicht denke, 27
Happiness for ourselves and others. Duty must be
done for duty^s sake, but we could not rationally do
it if we did not hope to attain happiness. It is out
of harmony with the perfect volition of a rational
being to desire happiness, to be worthy of it, and yet
ApH,239.
In a letter to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766.
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not to share in it. Although happiness is a purpose in
nature, it should not "be made the only ground of a good
disposition,^® Man is not made for the sake of happiness.
Morality proper is not concerned V7ith the way in
which we can become happy hut it tells us how we shall
become worthy of happiness, because happiness is not an
unconditioned good,
Daher ist auch die Moral nicht eigentlich
die Lehre, wie wir uns glflcklich raachen,
sondem wie wir der Glttckseligkeit wftrdig
werden sollen.29
Die Glflckseligkeit ist, mit der ganzen
Ftllle ihrer Annehralichkeit , bei weitem
nicht ein unbedingtes Gut, 30
Reason already presupposes that every man expects that
degree of happiness of which he has made himself worthy
by his conduct. Thus the desire for happiness does not
directly come under our concept of duty. We are not
bound by duty to promote either our own happiness or
the happiness of another, for it is in the very act of
seeking his ovm happiness that the perfection of another












Was ein jeder ijnvermeidlich schon von selTost
will, das gehiJrt nicht unter den Begriff von
Pflicht; denn diese ist eine ITdJtigung zu einem
ungern genommenen Zv/eck: Ss v/iderspricht sich
also zu sagen: man sei verpflichtet , seine
eigene CJlflclcseligkei t mit alien Erftften zu
"bef(9rdem. SlDenso ist es ein Widerspruch,
eines anderen Vollkommenheit rair zum Zv/eck zu
machen und mich zu deren BefiJrderung fi!lr ver-
pflichtet zu halt en. Denn darin hesteht eben
die Vollkommenheit eines anderen Menschen als
einer Person, dass er sellDst vermdgend ist,
sich seinen Zweck nach seinen eigenen Begriffen
von Pflicht zu setzen.31
However, there are instances when it becomes indirectly
our duty to strive for happiness, for instance, if lack
of contentment might cause failure to perform one* s
duty.
Seine eigene Glflckseligkeit sichern, ist
Pflicht (wenigstens indirekt); denn der
Ilangel der Zufriedenheit mit seinem Zustande
in einem GedrAnge von vielen Sorgen und
mitten unter unbefriedigten Bedfirfnissen
kiJnnte leicht eine grosse Versuchung zu
UelDertretung der Pflichten werd-en,32
The highest good and immortality. Since in this
world of the senses happiness and worthiness are not
equally proportioned, the adjustment will be made in the





faction of the inclinations of the senses can be obtained
in a realm in which there is no sensihility . Yet Kant's
conception of the highest good, which is neither virtue
nor happiness alone hut a moral v;orld in which happiness
33
is duly proportioned according to merit, requires this
kind of immortality.
Also ist das hiJchste Gut praktisch nur unter
der Voraussetzung der ITnsterhlichkeit der
Seele m(!Jglich.34
Alle Moralitat der Handlungen kann nach der
Ordnung der ITatur niemals ihre vollstSndige
Wirkung in dem leihlichen Lehen des Menschen
hahen, wohi aher in der Geistenvelt nach
pneumati schen Gesetzen.35
Sympathy and love of humanity . It is true that
Kant never shared the optimism of Shaftesbury and
Rousseau regarding the essential goodness of man.*^^
He recognized the fact of evil and warned us not to
make it our duty to increase evil in the world by per
forming benevolent deeds because of mere sympathy.
Es kann aber unra^Jglich Pflicht sein, die
Uebel in der Welt zu vermehren, mi thin auch
nicht aus Mitleid wohlzutunj wie denn dieses









Kant rejected sentimental love and asserted that we
stand under a discipline of reason, "Wir stehen unter
einer Disziplin der Vemunft.""^® This fact that we are
responsilDle to ourselves as rational "beings makes us
39despise tender-hearted sympathy hut hinds us to love
rationally. The principles of morality must derive their
authority solely from reason.
IJitfreude und llitleid. , .als Ilittel zu
Bef(Srderung des tfttigen und verntlnftigen
Wohlwollens zu gehrauchen, ist noch eine
hesondere, ohzwar nur hedingte Pflicht
uhter dem ITamen der Menschlichkeit . 41
Consequently we should never treat humanity in ourselves
and in others merely as a means "but always as an end,
Kant means hy humanity within ourselves and others
practical reasonf^ and he admits that "der Mensch ist
zwar unheilig genug, aher die Menschheit in seiner
Person muss ihm heilig sein,"'^^
Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl
in deiner Person als in der Person eines
jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck,
niemals hloss als Mittel brauchst,44
Development of all our powers. Just as the










Mitfreude and Mitleid are only indirect or conditioned
duties, so is the desire to develop all our powers
something that we necessarily do without "being urged.
As a rational "being man wants the harmonious growth
of his capacities. It is a duty which he owes to
himself.
Der An"bau (cultura) seiner ITaturkrSlfte
(Geistes-, Seelen- und Lei'beskrftfte ) als
Mitt el zu allerlei radglichen Zwecken ist
Pflicht des Henschen gegen sich 8el"bst.45
All the capacities implanted in a creature are
destined to unfold themselves completely and con-
forma"bly to their end in the course of time.
Alle TTaturanlagen eines GeschiJpfes sind





2. THE MORAL GOIICEPTIOITS OF ITIETZSCHE
Morality and its purpose* Morality originated
from the instinctive desire of the different races to
live under conditions which "best subserved their own
welfare. When the moral code was once formialated and
found good, each race sought to give it force and
permanence.
Die Moral ist wesentlich das Mittel,, TSher
die Einzelnen hinweg, oder vielraehr durch
eine Versklavung der Einzelnen etwas zur
Dauer zu hringen.l
Sotald der Mensch Zwang austthen kann,
tlht er ihn aus, um seine Sitten durchzu-
setzen und einzuffthren, denn fflr ihn sind
sie die bewSlhrte Lehensweisheit.
2
In order to secure even more force and permanence
for the moral code it was, when the time cajne for
fashioning religious systems, credited to the gods
or God. Thus the mere expression of instinct "became
the mandate of a divine law-giver. Human laws were
changed into inhuman commands.
As a result of his investigation ITietzsche con-






called moral act is an interpretation,
Es giTst keine moralischen Fhanomenei sondern
nur eine moralische Interpretation dieser
Phftnomene.
3
According to slave morality anyone is regarded as
immoral who seeks spiritual as well as material power.
Pride, amlDition, and acquisition of property are
condemned as evils, whereas humility, forgiveness,
contentment, and resignation are esteemed virtues.
The success of this kind of morality is due to the
fact that the weak so overvj-helmingly outnumbered the
strong that they could enforce the rules which they
thought "best for their own protection. According to
master morality mercy and S3niipathy are considered as
weaJcnesses, whereas individuality and strength are
cultivated. Everj/one ought to decide for himself
which kind of morality is "best suited to his ahilities.
But rememher well, the nohlest and the highest never
appeal to the masses.
Das Edelste und Hflchste v;irkt gar nicht





Morality is essentially a matter of our own v/ill,
Man is eCble to make a free decision. On this ability
depends his feeling of duty.
Das Gefflhl der Pflicht hSugt daran, dass
wir in hezug auf den Urakreis unserer Ilacht
denselhen Glauhen hahen, wie die andern:
nfljnllch das wir bestimmte Dinge versprechen,
uns zu ihnen verpflichten kflnnen (,, Freiheit
des Willens") .5
Yet the member of the master morality has this dis-
advantage that he will always he considered as immoral
by the masses because he does not depend on traditions,
customs, and habits, but on himself.
Der freie Mensch ist unsittlich, weil er in
allem von sich und nicht von einem Herkommen
abhSngen wi 11 ,
6
Aber ich habe auch noch in einem andren
Sinne das V/ort Immoralist zum Abzeichen,
zum Ehrenzeichen f^lr raich gewfthlt; ich
bin stolz darauf , dies 'Vort zu haben, das
mich gegen die ganze Ilenschheit abhebt.7
o
Morality is always an individual matter. It is always
changing but not without a purpose.
Alles auf dem Gebiete der Moral ist geworden,
wandelbar, schwankend, alles ist im Flusse, es









The meaning of good and load. It is mere speculation
to determine whether this is the best or the worst of
conceivalDle v/orlds, iDecause the moral law is confined
to man while the rest of nature is completely indifferent,
Ahgesehen von aller Theologie und ihrer
Bekftmpfung liegt es auf der Hand, dass die
Welt nicht gut und nicht iDdJse, geschweige
denn die heste Oder die schlechteste ist
und dass diese Eegriffe gut" und hiSse"
nur in bezug auf Menschen Sinn haben, ja
selhst hier, in der '.Veise wie sie gewflhnlich
gebraucht werden, nicht "berechtigt sind.lO
The terms good and tad depend on moral judgment s."^"^ Up
to the present time they have "been but rela.tive terms.
We have imagined their meaning but never known it.
Die Rangordnung der Gflter ist aber keine zu
alien Zeiten feste und gleiche; wenn jemand
Rache der Gerechtigkeit vorzieht, so ist er
nach dem Massstabe einer fnSheren Kultur
moral isch, nach dem der jetzigen unmoralisch. 12
0 meine Brflder, fiber Sterne und Zukunft
ist bisher nur gewfthnt, nicht gewusst
word en; und darum ist fiber Gut und BiJse
bisher nur gewfthnt, nicht gewusst wordenl^^
¥enn der Mensch sich nicht mehr fflr biJse
hM,lt, hflrt er auf, es zu 8einI14
The relativity of the terms good and bad is also









were denounced as criminalB when they tried to set
aside the prevailing customs, "but when their plans
succeeded they were hailed as benefactors.
Jeder der das "bestehende Sittengesetz um-
warf, hat bisher zuerst imraer als schlechter
Mensch gegolten: aber wenn man, wie es vor-
kam, hinterher es nicht wieder aufzurichten
vermochte und sich damit zufrieden gab, so
ver^nderte sich das PrAdikat allmSlhlich; --
die Creschichte handelt fast nur von diesen
schlechten Menschen, welche spM.ter gutge-
sprochen v/orden sind.^^
¥ir Forscher sind wie alle Eroberer
Entdecker Schiffahrer Abenteurer von einer
verwegenen Moralitftt und mflssen es uns
gefallen lassen, im ganzen fflr bdse zu
gelten,16
Good is therefore synonymous with bravery, strength,
power, control,
'7as ist gut?—Alles was das Gefflhl der ITacht,
den Willen zur Macht, die Macht selbst im
Menschen erhflht.17
In these passages TTietzsche does not mean brutal
and ruthless force. His will to power is a Vv'ill to
control, an architect, an artist, end an improver of
human nature, not a revolutionary and destructive
i:0R,I,20; cf. ^VzM,317,318.
loiI0R,V,432.




The Categorical Imperative, Affirmation of
life is a theme that runs all through Hi etzsche'
s
writings "because his whole philosophy sprang from
his will to iDecome healthy,
Ich ras.chte aus meinem ¥illen zur Gesund-
heit, zum Lehen, meine Philosophic,!^
Learn to face your destiny unafraid! Affirm life
and be courageous
I
Alles in allem und grossen: ich will
irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender
sein:20
Life is worth more than science and knowledge, for
knowledge that would destroy life would destroy
itself. Thus knowledge presupposes life and is
interested in its preservation.
Das Leben ist die hOhere, die herrschende
Gewalt, denn ein Erkennen, welches das
Lehen vernichtet, wtlrde sich selhst mit
vernichtet hahen. Das Erkennen setzt
das Leben voraus» hat also an der Erhaltung
des Lebens dasselbe Interesse, welches
jedes Wesen an seiner eigenen Fort-
exist enz hat, 21
This affirmation of life hecomes Uietzsche's
categorical imperative, '7e ought to affirm life to





such an extent that we are willing to perform every act
in such a way that we vrant to have it repeated an eternal
number of times.
War das das Lehen? 7/ohlanI Foch Sinmall^S
Die Frage Toei allem und jedera: villst c'u
dies noch einmal und noch unzSlhlige Male? "23
This imperative is a severe test of our actions. There-
fore TTietzsche gives the additional imperative: Become
hard I
Der Iraperativ werdet hartl", die unterste
Gewissheit darflber, dass alle Schaffenden
hart sind, ist das eipentliche Ah^eichen
einer dionysischen ITatur.24
This imperative to become hard is almost identical
with becoming strong so as to be consistent regardless
of the consequences. TTietzsche actually demonstrated
this principle in his relationship r^ith Richard V/agner.
As soon as he realized that Wagner tried to satisfy the
demands of the church, Fietzsche broke this intimate
bond of friendship and never saw Wagner again. The
same consistency is demonstrated in his demand to live
dangerously, in his reckless devotion to ideas, in
2?
o,AsZ,III, ^'"om Gesicht und Hfttsel , 1, 158
.
^^F?MV,341.






his assertion that the service of truth is the hardest^'
and that it cannot he hased on nohle feelings. ° The
Vv'hole manner in which ITietzsche utters his criticisms
reserahles more the tight-rope dancer, whose recklessness
may ruin his life at any moment, than a fearful and
meek servant of some henevolent prince.
Yet this consistency is not completely without
regard for consequences.
Die Wahrheit muss gesagt werden, und
wenn die Telt in Stillcke gehen solltel
so ruft, rait grossem Munde, der grosse
Fichte!—Jal Jal Aher man ra*lsste sie auch
hahenI--A'ber er meint, jeder solle seine
Keinung sagen, und wenn alles drunter
und drflber ginge. Darflher liesse sich
rait ihm noch rechten.29
Consequences ought to "be considered. ITietzsche is
sure that if he remains true to his principles he will
some day he regarded as the most "benevolent man that
ever lived.
Grundgedanke: wir mT^ssen die Zukunft als
massgehend nehmen filr alle unsere V/ert-
scha,tzung--und nicht hinter uns die Gesetze
unseres Handelns suchen.30
Ich hin hei weitem der furchtharste
Mensch, den es "bisher gegehen hat; dies






•^-••Eh, Tarum ich ein Schicksal hin, 2.
1
32
The voice of conscience. To the cave man things
did not seem good or "bad, "but loeneficial or harmful.
He gave his rrill to power free exercise. However, when
civilization was horn there arose the necessity of con-
trolling and regulating this will to power. The indi-
vidual had to suhrait to the desire of the majority.
The result was that his will to power, which once
spent itself in hattles with others, had now to turn
upon himself. Instead of torturing others, man hegan
to torture his own "body and mind. His ancient delight
in cruelty remained, hut he could no longer satisfy it
hy fighting his fellow men. Thus conscience arose
which is no more than the will to power turned inwa,rd.
Straightway man hecame a iprey to the feeling of guilt,
of sinfulness, and of wrongdoing.
Das ist der Hrsprung des ,, schlechten
Gewissens" . . ,llit ihm war die grdJsste
Erlcrankung eingeleitet, von welcher die
IJenschheit his heute nicht genesen ist,
das Leiden des llenschen am Henschen , an
sich ; als die Folge einer gewaltsamen
Ahtrennung von der tierischen Vergangen-
heit, eines Sprunges und Sturzes gleich-
sam in neue Lagen und Daseins-Bedingungen,
einer TCriegserkl^rung gegen die alten
Instinkte, auf den en his dahin seine K^raft,
Lust und Furchtharkeit heruhte. Pflgen wir
sofort hinzu, dass andrerseits mit der
Tatsache einer gegen sich selhst gekehrten
...Tierseele auf Erden etwas so >Teues,
Tiefes, TJnerhflrtes, Rat selhaftes, Wider-
tt » •
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spruchsvolles und Zukunftsvolles gegeben war,
dass der Aspekt der Erde sich damit wesent-
lich veranderte.
Such a conscience which is no more than ingrown fear,
pathological self-torture, and an accumulation of
prejudices and hahits, cannot be an infallible guide
to moral conduct. But there is in man an intellectual
conscience behind this cloak of customs which is the
voice of reason.
Gibt es kein (Jewissen mehr? ¥eisst du
nichts von einera intellektuellen Gewissen?
Einem Gewissen hinter deinem ,, Gewissen •»?33
Den meisten fehlt das intellektuale
Gewissen. 34
Happiness for ourselves and others. The ^^orld is
not intended for the purpose of satisfying instincts,
so that the masses might find their happiness in it.
Die Welt ist zura Gl*[ck nicht auf Instinkte
hin gebaut, dass gerade bloss gutmfltiges
Herdengetier darin sein enges Gl^lck fande.35
The desire for happiness has no place in reality.
Everyvi'here we find the will to power.
Worum kftmpfen die Bftume eines Urv/aldes
miteinander? Um ,, Gl«ck'»?--Ura Macht 1 36
5^ZGM,II,16.
SfW,335.





Man never strove for happiness, he yearned for
power, for work, for activity. This is demonstrated
"by the fact that he is not happier today than the
former generations were in their time, but he has
increased his power. Man*s happiness is his activity.
Trachte ich denn nach CrliScke? Ich trachte
nach meinen Werke!37
Der Mensch, im Vergleich zu einem Vor-
menschen, stellt ein ungeheures Quantum
Macht dar,--nicht ein Plus von „Glflck"I
Wie kann man hehaupten, dass er nach
GliSck gestreht ha"be?38
Activity gives us pleasure and pleasure wants
eternity. "Alle Lust will Ewigkeit,"39 However, this
>Tietzschean eternity or immortality is nothing more
than conservation of energy or eternal return.
Erwftgt man nun gar, dass jede Hand lung
eines Menschen, nicht nur ein Buch, auf
irgendeine Art Anlass zu anderen Handlungen,
EntschKlssen , Gedanken wird, dass alles,
was geschieht, unlflsbar fest sich rait allem,
was geschehen wird, verknotet, so erkennt
man die wirkliche Unsterhlichkeit , die es
gibt, die der Bewegung: was einmal "bewegt
hat, ist in dem Gesamtverhande alles
Seienden, wie in einem Bernstein ein Insekt,
eingeschlossen und verewigt.40
AsZ,IV, Das Zeichen, 336.
WzM,301.




Sympathy and love of humanity. It is imperative
that we should love ourselves with a wholesome love
before we have a right to love others.
¥er aher leicht werden will und ein Vogel,
der muss sich selher liehen. . .Ficht freilich
rait der LielDe der Siechen und Sflchtigen:
denn hei denen stinkt auch die Eigenliehel
Man muss sich seller liehen lernen,.,mit
einer heilen und gesunden Liebe.41
Certainly we should he henevolent^^and show our
sympath3r,^'^hut we should not preach sympathy without
fellowship of joy. Friends who prove themselves
friends in sorrow as well as in fortune and success
are real friends. "Mitfreude, nicht Hitleiden, macht
den Freund."^^ One can test any sympathetic person
hy the degree of joy which he shares v/ith his fellow
man.
Die mitleidigen, im Unglflck jederzeit
hilfreichen JTaturen sind selten zugleich
die sich mitfreuenden: beim Ulflclc der
anderen haben sie nichts zu tun, sind
tlberf Iftssig, fflhlen sich nicht im Besitz
ihrer Ueberlegenheit und zeigen deshalb
leicht Kissvergn«gen.45
Since we should accept life with its pains and
sufferings, everj^one who dwells too long on sympathy







will inevitably get sick and melancholic.
Y/er einmal, versuchswei se, den Anlftssen zum
Mitleiden im praktischen Le"ben eine Zeitlang
absichtlich nachgeht und sich alles Elend,
dessen er in seiner Umgebung habhaft werden
kann, immer vor die Seele stellt, wird un-
vermeidlich krank und raelancholisch. Wer aber
gar als Arzt in irgendeinera Sinne der Mensch-
heit dienen v/ill, wird gegen jene Empfindung
sehr vorsichtig werden mtlssen,-- sie l^hmt
ihn in alien entscheidenden Augenblicken und
unterbindet sein Wissen und seine hilfreiche
feine Hand. 46
Woe be unto those who have no more to offer than
weakening sympathy!
Tehe alien Liebenden, die nicht no oh eine
Rflhe haben, welche <lber ihrem Mitleiden istl47
Even though ITietzsche demands a wholesome love of
one*s self, it is impossible to call him an egoist in
the bad sense of that term.
Die Gutmfltigkeit , die Freundlichkeit , die
Hflflichkeit des Herzens sind imraerquellende
Ausflttsse des unegoistischen Triebes und
haben viel raAchtiger an der Kultur gebaut,
als jene viel ber<thmteren Aeusserungen des-
selben, die man Mitleiden, Barmherzigkeit
und Aufopferung nennt.48
Je hflher wir uns erheben, um so kleiner
erscheinen wir denen, welche nicht fliegen
kOnnen.49
^.i[0R,II,134.





Love of one's neighlDor has often been used to
50
cover up the hardest egoism. Therefore it is not
enough to pretend to love our neighbor.
Das Gehot der ITftchstenliehe ist noch nieinals
zu einem Gebot der Nachbarliebe erweitert
word en. 51
Higher than the love of one's neighbor stands the
love of the distant future.
Meine BnStder, zur Uftchstenliebe rate ich
euch nicht: ich rate euch zur Fernst en-
Li ebe. 53
We must possess a depth of real personality that can
carry us beyond weakening sympathy to something con-
structive. Apart from the fact that no one has ever
54done anything without a personal motive, let us
recognize our duties to huma.nity. Let us perform the
deeds that are characteristic of a higher culture.












3. THE RESULT OF THii Tl'TVESTIGATION
Kant
1, The free and rational
will of man is the only
foundation for morality,
2. The principles of
morality are valid for
all men.
3. Only a rational will is
ahsolutely good.
4. The moral will of God
and the moral will of man
are expressions of the same
laws of reason and conse-
quently identical,
5. Conscience is practical
reason.
6. Practical reason demands
consistency without pre-
dilection. Duty must he
done for duty's sake,
7. 7/e stand under a
discipline of reason. There-
fore treat humanity in
yourself as well as in
others as an end, and never
merely as a means!
8. The Categorical Impera-
tive is: act so that the
maxim of thy will can "be
made a universal lawl
ITietzsche
1, There are no moral
phenomena. Every moral act
is an interpretation.
2, Everyone ought to decide
for himself whether he v^ants
to become a master or a
slave.
3, Good is any will or
power which "brings ahout
order and improvement.
4, Moralitj'- is an
expression of the will to
power.
5, An intellectual conscience
is our guide to conduct.
6, Master morality demands
reckless consistency regard-
less of the consequences to
yourself,
7, We are obliged to realize
the ideal of the distant
future: supermen. Humanity
is a means to that end.
8. The Categorical Imperative
is: act so that you are
willing to perform this act




9. Sympathy should, not
interfere with the rational
performance of our duty.
10, We despise tender-
hearted sympathy, but affirm
Mitfreud e and Mitleid as
means to the advancement of
rational "benevolence.
11, It is our duty to
become worthy of happiness.
12, As a rational being
man necessarily wants all
his powers to be harmonious-
ly developed.
13, Sometimes it is our
duty to strive for happiness
if lack of it might cause
failure to perform our
duty,
14, Be always consistent!
15. Sometimes it is our
duty to consider consequences.
16, Mere self-interest
poisons morality at its root,
17, Immortality is necessary
in order that happiness may
be duly proportioned in
accordance with worthiness.
9, We should possess a
depth that can carry us
beyond mere sympathy to
something constructive,
10, Friends who prove
themselves friends in
sorrow as well as in success
are real friends. Mitfreude
is more important than
Mitleid.
11, Every noble person has
respect for himself.
12, Superior men will be
perfectly balanced indivi-
duals.
13, Man never strove for
happiness, he yearned for
power, for work. Activity
makes him happy.
14, Life is more than
logic,
15, We ought to consider
the most remote consequences
of our acts.
16, Love yourself with a
wholesome love..
17, All pleasure wants
eternity, but immortality
is simply motion, eternal




Kant put an end to one-sided intellectual! sm "by
making the free and rational will of man the only "basis
for morality. There is nothing that can "be called good
except a good will. It is necessary that the will oloey
the commands of reason, without regard for consequences.
Duty must "be done for duty's sake. We stand under a
discipline of reason which makes us despise tender-
hearted sympathy. Strive to TDe worthy of happinessi
Immortality is necessarj^ in order that happiness may
iDe proportioned according to worthiness.
ITietzsche treated morality as an expression of
the will to power. The moral person does not seek his
happiness, he seeks his work. Good is synonymous v'ith
"bravery, power, and control. Svery act ought to "be
motivated "by the furthest ideal. ¥e ought to live this
life as if it were our eternal life,
Kant and ITietzsche agree on the following
principles: (1) morality is essentially a matter of
the free will; (2) moral laws must "be consistently
o"beyed regardless of consequences; (3) conscience
should "be the voice of reason; (4) self-respect

should precede altruism; (5) sympathy should "be
exhilDited only sparingly; (6) there is a striking
resemblance "between Kant*s categorical imperative,
"Act as if the maxim of thy action were "by thy will
to "become the universal law of nature" and Nietzsche'
principle that we ought to live this life in such a
way as to be willing to live it over and over again.
Hietzsche differs from Kant on these essential
points: (1) he distinguishes "between slave and
master morality; (2) he considers humanity as a
means to the production of superior men; (3) he
gives more emphasis to consequences in judging
moral acts; (4) he is more concerned with wholesome
love of one's self.

GliAPTER III
THE POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS OF KAITT AMD NIETZSCHE
Most of the shortcomings of Kant's moral philosophy
are taken care of in his political theory where he gives
due consideration to the full and harmonious development
of man. The contrast m th Nietzsche is reduced to a
minimum. They are "both struggling to obtain freedom in
human relations and do not forget that the progress of the
development of the human species is effected "by great
1
and powerful egoistic impulses.
1. THE POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS OF KANT
Development of all capacities. For Kant history
is a development of all the capacities with which nature
has endowed the human race. All the capacities, implanted
in a creature by nature, are destined to unfold themselves
completely and conformably to their end in the course of
time,
Alle Naturanlagen eines Geschflpfes sind
bestimmt, sich einmal vollstftndig und zweck-
raflssig auszuwickeln.S
Yet these natural capacities, which are directed towards
the use of reason, can be completely developed only in





the species and not in the individual.
Am Menschen, (ale dem einzigen verntlnftigen
Geschflpf auf Erden) sollten sich diejenigen
ITaturanlagen, die auf den GrelDrauch seiner
Vernunft ahgezielt sind, nur in der Gattung,
^
nicht aher im Indiviciuum vollstftndig entwickeln.
Reason does not work hy instinct. It requires
experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance
gradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence
each man would have to live an enormous length of time
in order to learn "by himself how to make a complete use
of all his natural endowments. Kant's ideal is the
complete culture of the human race "by means of its own
reason, nature has willed that man shall produce wholly
out of himself all that goes beyond the mechanical
structure and arrangement of his animal existence. He
shall participate in no other happiness or perfection
than that he has procured for himself, apart from instinct,
by his own reason.
Die ITatur hat gewollt, dass der Mensch alles,
was itther die mechanische Anordnung seines
tierischen Daseins geht, gftnzlich aus sich
selhst heraushringe und keiner anderen GKlck-
seligkeit Oder Vollkommenheit teilhaftig werde,
als die er sich selbst, frei von Instinkt durch
eigene Vernunft verschafft hat.
4
All the sources of delight which make life bearable,





work. The purpose of nature, however, is not so much to
give man an agreeahle life, hut to advance his own self-
culture until he makes himself worthy of life and well-being.
The means which nature employs to "bring ahout the
development of all the capacities implanted in men is their
mutual antagonism in society, "but only so far as this
antagonism becomes at length the cause of an order among
them that is regulated by law.
Das Mittel, dessen sich die ITatur bedient, die
Entwicklung aller ihrer Anlagen zustande zu
bringen, ist der Antagonism derselben in der
Gesellschaft , sofern dieser doch am Ende die
TJrsache einer gesetzmflssigen Ordnung derselben
wird. Ich verstehe hier unter dem Antagonism
die ungesellige Geselligkeit der Menschen.^
Man wants concord. Nature wants discord, because she
knows better what is good for her species. Turning from
idleness and inactive contentment, man shall throw himself
into toil and suffering in order to find remedies against
them and to develop his capacities. Man is a social being
because he can develop his capacities in society alone.
On the other hand, he is the most unsocial creature. Sven
the animals are more social than he, because they have a
tendency to ease and comfort. Man, however, possesses
three impulses which drive him on to a constant struggle





Dank sei also der ITatur f«lr die Unvert rag sam-
keit, fflr die mi ssgiSnstig wetteifernde Eitelkeit,
fUr die nicht zu "befriedigende Begierde zum
Ha"ben, Oder auch zum Herrschen! Ohne sie warden
alle vortreffliche ITaturanlagen in der Menschheit
ewig unentwickelt schlumraern. Der Mensch will
Eintracht; alDer die Natur weiss "besser, was fflr
seine Gattung gut ist; sie will Zwietracht.6
Antagonism is essential to progress and yet there is need
for a common social life. The solution of this prololem is
found in the state where the antagonisms are regulated by
laws.
Origin and essence of the state. Anti-social "beings,
who are moved "by glory, gain, and power, are constantly at
war with one another. In order not to perish in the war
of all against all, they are forced to form an order that
is regulated "by law. Even if a people were not compelled
"by internal discord to submit to public laws, war as an
external influence would effect it, because without an
organized state a people could not defend itself against
invasion.
Y/enn ein Volk auch nicht durch innere Misshel-
ligkeit gendtigt wflrde, sich unter den Zwang
flffentlicher Gesetze zu begeben, so v/flrde es
doch der Krieg von aussen tun, indem nach der
vorher erwfthnten Haturanstalt ein jedes Volk
ein anderes es drftngende Volk zum Nachbar vor
sich findet, gegen das es sich innerlich zu
einem Staat bilden muss, urn als Macht gegen





The state is therefore a product of reason and established
in the interest of all. Kant definitely shows that the
social order cannot "be a mere aggregate of independent
persons, "but is a unity in which everyone gives up his
unlimited freedom and receives a limited freedom in return
which is protected "by the power of the state. Thus the
state is maintained on the "basis of a contract which is
no historical fact "but a rational idea.
Allein dieser Vertrag..., als Koalition jedes
"besondern und Privatv/i liens in einem Volk zu
einem gemeinschaft lichen und tfffent lichen Willen
ist keinesweges als ein Paktum vorauszu-
setzen nfltig (ja als ein solches gar nicht
mflglich); gleichsam als o"b allererst aus der
Geschichte vorher "bewiesen werden mflsste, dass
ein Volk, in dessen Rechte und Ver"bindlichkeiten
wir als ITachkommen getreten sind, einmal wirklich
einen solchen Aktus verrichtet und eine sichere
Nachricht oder ein Instrument davon uns raflndlich
Oder schriftlich hinterlassen ha"ben mtflsse, um
sich an eine schon hestehende "bflrgerliche
"Verfassung fflr gehunden zu achten. Sondern es
ist eine "blosse Idee der "Vemunft.^
According to Kant the state is therefore a people which
rules itself. "Ein Staat ist ein Volk, das sich sel"bst
"beherrscht , "^^ Consequently everyone must share in the
making of the law so that in the law he actually o'beys
his own will.
Die gesetzge"bende Gewalt kann nur dem
vereinigten Y/illen des Volkes zukoramen. Denn
da von ihr alles Recht ausgehen soli, so muss








?ormB of government* According to his definition
of the state as the people and according to his definition
of a citizen as a lawmaker, Kant may he called a modem
12democrat, although he hranded democracy as despotism
hecause the majority decides against those who are not
in accord with its decision.
Unter den drei Staatsformen ist die der
Demokratie im eigentlichen Verstande des Worts
notwendig ein Despotismus, weil sie eine
exekutive Gewalt grflndet, da alle flher und
allenfalls auch wider Einen (der also nicht
miteinst immt ) , mi thin alle, die doch nicht
alle sind, heschliessen; welches ein Wider-
spruch des allgemeinen Willens rait sich
selhst und mit der Freiheit ist, 13
The counterpart of democracj/" is monarchy. Concerning
the latter Kant says that it is technically the simplest
form of government because everyone is obedient and
passive except the ruler who does not regard his subjects
as citizens.
Das Simplifizieren ist zwar im Maschinenwerk
der Vereinigung des Volks durch Zwangsgesetze
die vemflnftige Maxime; wenn nftmlich alle im
Volk passiv sind und einem, der fiber sie ist,
gehorchen; aber das gibt keine Untertanen als
Staat sbfirger ,14
Kant rejects the monarchical form because the lawgiver
as one and the same person may be the executive admin-







of the people. The highest power "belongs to the people.
All individual rights are derived from it.
Denn in ihm (dem Volk) hefindet sich urspr^nglich
die oherste Gewalt, von der alle Rechte der
einzelnen, als "blosser Untertanen. . .ahgeleitet
werden mftssen.^S
Since it is impossible practically for everyone
to "be a ruler Kant accepts the republican or representa-
tive form of government. The fewer the number of rulers
and the greater the representation embodied in them, the
more the political constitution harmonizes with
republicanism.
Ifen kann daher sagen; je kleiner das
Personale der Staatsgewalt (die Zahl der
Herrscher), je griJsser dagegen die Repre-
sentation derselben, desto mehr stimmt die
Staat sverfassung zur MiJglichkeit des Repu-
blikanism, und sie kann hoffen, durch all-
mSlhliche Reformen sich dazu endlich zu
erheben .16
Anarchy is law and freedom without central power,
despotism law and power without freedom, barbarism power
without freedom and law, but a republic is a central
power with freedom and law.
A. Gesetz und Freiheit ohne Gewalt (Anarchie).
B. Gesetz und Gewalt ohne Freiheit (Despotism).
C. Gewalt ohne Freiheit und Gesetz (Barbarei).









Functions of government. The chief prohlera of any-
political constitution is the prohlem of power. A republic
is a power with freedom and law. It is a form of government
from which any arbitrary misuse of power is excluded. While
in a monarchy the legislative, the administrative, and the
judicial powers were concentrated in one person, in a
republic these functions of government are separated for
the purpose of making freedom under laws possible.
Ein jeder Staat enthftlt drei Gewalten in sich,
d,i, den allgemein vereinigten '.Villen in dreifacher
Person..,: die He rr sche rgewal
t
(SouveranitSlt ) in
der des Gesetzgebers, die volTzi ehende Gewalt in
der des Regierers (zufolge dem Gesetz), und die
recht ssprechende Gewalt (als Zuerkennung des
Semen ernes jeden nach dem Gesetz) in der Person
des Richters.18
If man lives among others of his kind he needs a
master who breaJcs his self-will and compels him to obey
a universal will in relation to which everyone is free.
This master is reason and the universal will is the state.
The functions of government are therefore to preserve the
rational principles of freedom, equality, and political
indepenaence.lS
Principles of political right. Political maxims





"be accepted disregarding the physical consequences which
will follow their adoption.
Die politischen Maximen mflssen nicht von der,
aus ihrer Befolgung zu erwart end en, Wohlfahrt
und Gl<lckselig]cei t eines jeden Staats also nicht
vom Zweck, den sich ein jeder derselhen zum
Gegenstande macht (vom Wollen) , als dem ohersten
(aher erapirischen ) Princip der Staatsweisheit,
sondern von dem reinen Begriff der Rechtspflicht
(vom Sollen, dessen Princip a priori durch reine
Vernunft gegeben ist) ausgehen, die physischen g
Folgen daraus mflgen auch sein, welche sie v/ollen,
A true political philosophy cannot advance a step without
first paying homage to the principles of morality. We
cannot devise a modified condition of right intermediate
"between justice and utility. All politics must how the
knee before the principle of right.
Man kann hier nicht halbieren und das Mitt el-
ding eines pragmati sch-hedingten Rechts (zwischen
Recht und Nutzen) aussinnen, sondern alle Politik
muss ihre Knie vor dem ersteren heugen, kann aher
daftlr hoffen, ohzwar langsam, zu der Stufe zu
gelangen, wo sie "beharrlich gl^zen wird.^l
The essence of right, however, consists in the limitation
of the freedom of each individual corresponding v;ith the
equally limited freedom of all others,
Recht ist die Einschr^nkung der Freiheit
eines jeden auf die Bedingung ihrer Zusammen-
stimmung mit der Freiheit von jedermann, inso-











Yet the state is not justified in limiting the freedom
of the individual further than regard for the maintenance
of right demands. For instance, the state has no right
to exercise influence upon thoughts and "beliefs. Censor-
ship and forlDidding of criticism will result in injury to
intellectual progress. It would "be a crime against man
whose real vocation consists in making progress.
Die Bestimraung des menschlichen Geschlechts
im Ganzen ist unaufhflrliches Fortschreiten, und
die Vollendung dersel"ben ist eine "blosse, aber
in aller A"bsicht sehr nfltzliche Idee von dem
Ziele, worauf v/ir der A"bsicht der "Vorsehung
geraSlss unsere Bestre"bungen zu richten haben.^
Die Menschen arbeiten sich von selbst nach und
nach aus der Rohigkeit heraus, wenn man nur nidit
absichtlich kflnstelt, urn sie darin zu erhalten.24
Kant's Recht slehre demands the widest possible
freedom of action. Reason should always be allowed
public expression, but within laws.
Der dffentliche Gebrauch seiner "Vernunft
muss jederzeit frei sein.26
Wenn die "Vernunft dera Gesetze nicht unter-
vrorfen sein will, das sie sich selbst gibt,
sie sich unter das Joch der Gesetze beugen
muss, die ihr ein anderer gibt; denn ohne
irgendein Gesetz kann gar nichts, selbst nicht
der griSsste Unsinn, sein Spiel lange treiben.27








claimed man as an autonomous law-giver. A system of
laws that would raalce it possilDle for anyone to "be used
as a mere means for the purposes of another is contrary
to the idea of right. Nothing can be more terrible than
that the actions of one man should he subject to the
will of another.^® A person should not allow himself to
be misused, nor should he let others trample his rights
under foot. Everyone is entitled to seek his own
happiness in the way that seems to him best, if he does
not infringe upon the liberty of others.
Wiemand kann mich zwingen, auf seine Art
(wie er sich das Wohlsein anderer Menschen
denkt ) gltlcklich zu sein, sondem ein jeder
darf seine Gl«lckseligkeit auf dem Wege suchen,
welcher ihra selbst gut dflnkt, wenn er nur
der Freiheit anderer, einem fthnlichen Zwecke
nachzustreben, die mit der Freiheit von
jedermann nach einem miJglichen allgemeinen
Gesetze zusajoraen bestehen kann (d.i, diesem
Rechte des andern), nicht Abbruch tut. 29
It is further the duty of the state to guarantee
equality of rights to all citizens. Everyone is equal
before the law. There are no private rights founded on
social distinctions. All positions should be open to
everyone according to the measure of his capacity.
Jedes Glied desselben muss zu jeder Stufe
eines Standes in deraselben {die einem Unter-
tan zukommen kann) gelangen dflrfen, wozu ihn
sein Talent, sein Fleiss und sein Glflck hin-
2«




"bringen kflnnen; und es dilrfen ihm seine Mit-
untertanen durch ein erbliches Prftrogativ
(als Privilegiaten fflr einen gewissen Stand)
nicht im Wege stehen, um ihn und seine ITach-
koramen unter demselben ewig niederzuhalten
,
A citizen has not only a right to freedom and
equality, he is also politically independent. By
political independence Kant means the sharing of all
citizens in the legislative power, with the exception
of women, children, and servants, who are naturally
dependent. Apart from these exceptions, which are
difficult to justify on rational grounds, Kant taught
that the political counterpart of moral autonomy is
to obey only those laws which one has decreed as a
memher of the legislative power.
Man can as little escape from the conception of
right in his private as in his public relations. We
do not venture to "build politics openly on the mere
manipulations of expediency or to renounce all obedience
to the conception of public right. The universal will,
as it is given a priori whether in one people or in the
relation of different peoples to each other, alone




It is the special problem of politics to establish
agreement with the people. The artifice of a kind of
policy that shuns the light would easily be frustrated
by publicity being given to its maxims. All principles
which require publicity in order that they may not fail
of their end are in accordance with right and politics.
For if these maxims can only attain their end by publicity
they must conform to the common end of the public.
Alle Maximen, die der Publicitat bedtlrfen
(urn ihren Zweclc nicht zu verfehlen), stimmen
mit R4cht und Politik vereinigt zusammen.^l
Alle auf das Recht anderer Menschen
bezogenen Handlungen, deren Maxime sich
nicht mit der PublicitM,t vertrftgt, sind
un recht • 32
A mgixim cannot be right if our publicizing it frustrates
our intention and arouses the resistance of all men
against our purpose. It is clear that this universal
opposition of all against us can arise from nothing else
than the injustice which such a maxim threatens to
everyone.
Since all actions relating to public rights are
wrong if their maxim is not compatible with publicity,




it "becomes plain that reToellion, were it publicly
professed, would make its ovm purpose impossilDle, It
would therefore have to "be kept secret.
Das Unrecht des Aufruhrs leuchtet also
dadurch ein, dass die Maxime desselben dadurch,
dass man sich flffentlich dazu hekennte, seine
eigene Ahsicht unm^glich machen ^rf^rde, Man
mfisste sie also notwendig verheimlichen. ^3
If certain defects are found in the constitution it is
the duty of the heads of the state to improve the consti-
tution so that it may "be brought more and more into
34
conformity with reason. Mankind is steadily progressing.
Outgrown institutions and laws make way for higher stages
of enlightenment. Yet this fact does not demand violent
revolutions, Kant stood for gradual reform according to
firm principles ( "allmMhliche Reform nach festen Grund-
satzen").^^
The meaning of war and its purpose. The repuhlican
constitution which Kant advocates requires also that the
members of the state should determine for themselves
whether there shall he war or not. In decreeing war
the people would thus he resolved to bring upon them-
selves all the horrors of war. This implies such









the costs of the war, to have to repair the devastations
which it leaves "behind, and to accept at the end a
hurden of deht which will go on embittering peace itself,
and which it will he impossible ever to pay off on account
of the constant threatening of further impending wars.
Thus war will gradually "be regarded as a very hazardous
undertaking, not only because of its artificiality and
uncertainty, but also because of its aftereffects in the
form of inextinguishable national debts,
Endlich wird selbst der Krieg allmfthlich
nicht allein ein so IcSnstliches, im Ausgange
von beiden Seiten so unsicheres, sondern auch
durch die Fachwehen, die der Staat in einer
immer anwachsenden Schuldenlast (einer neuen
Srfindung) fiUhlt, deren Tilgung unabsehlich
wird, ein so bedenkliches Unternehraen, dabei
der Einfluss, den jede Staat serschtltterung
in unserera durch seine Gewerbe so sehr ver-
ketteten Weltteil auf alle andere Staaten
tut, so merklich: dass sich diese, durch
ihre eigene Gefahr gedrungen, obgleich ohne
gesetzliches Ansehen, zu Schiedsri chtem
anbieten, und so alles von weitem zu einem
kflnftigen grossen Staatskflrper anschicken,
wovon die Vorwelt kein Bei spiel aufzuzeigen
hat. 36
Yet nothing in life is completely evil. Even war,
if it is conducted with order and with respect for civil
rights, is something sublime. Its dangers improve the




"breeds self-interest, cowardliness, and effeminacy.
Selbst der Krieg, wenn er mit Ordnung und
Heiligachtung der Mrgerlichen Rechte gefflhrt
wird, hat etwas Erhaloenes an sich und raacht
zugleich die Denkungsart des Volks, vi^elches
ihn auf diese Art ftlhrt, nur urn desto
erha"bener, je mehreren Gefahren es ausgesetzt
war und sich rautig darunter hat "behaupten
kflnnen; dahingegen ein langer Frieden den
"blossen Handelsgei st , mit ihm aber den
niedrigen Sigennutz» Feigheit und V/eichlich-
Iceit herrschend zu machen und die Denkungsart
des VolkB zu erniedrigen pflegt.37
This kind of war, of which Kant speaks, is simply an
imagination that has never actually occurred. Ifo war
can have respect for civil rights "because it is the
direct expression of self-interest and cowardliness to
face the world's problems rationally and courageously.
Kant himself admitted that the actual evils of war are
so great that they compel men to find out means by
which to overcome them. However, it is not only because
of the suffering that Kant objects to v;ar, but because
38it means constraint. In war man is used as a means
to an end which is a violation of the purpose of
creation.
Denn ftlr die Allgewalt der Katur Oder viel-
mehr ihrer uns unerreichbaren obersten Ursache
ist der Mensch wiederum nur eine Ideinigkeit.
Dass ihn aber auch die Herrscher von seiner





solche iDehandeln, indem sie ihn teils tierisch
als "blosses Werkzeug ihrer Absichten "belasten,
teils in ihren Streitigl-ceiten gegeneinander
aufstellen, urn sie schlachten zu lassen,--das
ist keine Kleinigkeit, sondern Urakehrung des
Endzwecks der Schflpfung selbst.^O
Kant never regarded war as an end, but always only
as a means to bring about a constitution in which all
the capacities of man can be fully developed. It is
our duty to realize a state of public right and if there
is a well-grounded hope of its being accomplished,
although it may only be by approximation that advances
ad infinitum, then perpetual peace is destined to follow
the falsity of the so-called treaties of peace which
have been but cessations of hostilities.
\7enn es Pflicht, wenn zugleich gegriUndete
Hoffnung da ist, den Zustand eines flffentlichen
Rechts, obgleich nur in einer ins Unendliche
fortschreitenden Ann fthe rung v/irklich zu machen,
so ist der ewige Friede, der auf die bisher
fftlschlich so genannten Friedensschlflsse
(eigentlich 7/affenstillst^nde ) folgt, keine
leere Idee, sondern eine Aufga,be, die nach
und nach aufgeliJst, ihrem Ziele (weil die
Zeiten, in denen gleiche Fortschritte geschehen,
hoffentlich immer kflrzer werden) bestSlndig
n^her kommt.40
LIJ, IV,136.
ZeF, Anhang II, last §.
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Program for achieving peace. The achievement of
peace is the entire purpose of jurisprudence.
Man kann sagen, dass diese allgemeine und
fortdauemde Friedensstiftung nicht bloss
einen Teil, sondern den ganzen Endzweck der
Rechtslehre innerhal"b der Grenzen der
"blossen Vernunft ausmache.'^l
These are the preliminary propositions which Kant
presented for the achievement of the ideal of eternal
peace. First, no peace agreement shall be held to be
valid when it has been made v/ith a secret reservation
that can be the material for a future war. Otherwise
it would be merely a suspension of hostilities.^^
Second, no state shall be acquirable by another state
through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.
The members of a state must not be abused as things that
may be managed at will."^^ Third, standing armies shall be
entirely abolished in the course of time because they
44
excite the states to outrival each other beyond limit.
Fourth, no national debts shall be contracted in connec-
tion with the external affairs of the state. A credit
system, when used as sm instrument of war, is a dangerous






money power when the delDts under it increase to an
excessive extent. The national iDankruptcy '-vhich
inevitalDly follows will necessarily involve many other
45
states. Fifth, no state shall interfere hy force with
the constitution and government of another state "because
such action would make the autonomy of all other states
insecure. Sixth, no state at war with another shall
adopt such modes of hostility as would render mutual
confidence in a future peace impossible, such as the
employment of assassins, poisoners, the violation of a
capitulation, and the instigation of treason in the
state of the enemy. There must remain some trust in the
enemy even during wartime, otherwise hostilities will
47pass into a war of extermination.
To these preliminary propositions Kant added three
definite articles: First, the civil constitution in
48
every state shall he repuhlican, A republican consti-
tution is founded on three principles: liberty,
dependence of all members of society on a single common
legislation, and equality of rights. Second, the right












states in which the rights of each shall be protected.
Third, the rights of men as citizens of the world shall
"be restricted to conditions of universal hospitality,^^
Since the possession of power inevitably corrupts
the free judgment of reason and the mere application of
existing laws does not lead to improvement, it is
imperative that the maxims of the philosophers regarding
the possibility of a public peace be taken into consi-
deration by the states that are armed for war.
Die Maxiraen der Philosophen <lber die
Bedingungen der MdJglichlceit des <Jffentlichen
Friedens sollen von den zum Kriege gerflsteten
Staaten zu Rate gezogen v;erden.5l
lTa.tions who govern themselves according to laws of
equality should not allow the philosophers as a class
to disappear or to be silenced. Rather should they be
allov/ed to speak forth their maxims publicly,
A confederation of all nations. Without solving
the problem of the relations between the states we cannot
52have a perfect civil constitution. Therefore the right
of nations shall be founded on a federation of free











may easily Tdc sho^'m. If, for instance, circumstances
"bring it about that a powerful sjrid enlightened people
forms itself into a republic, this will furnish a center
to which other states may gradually attach themselves.
Denn wenn das GlUc'k. es so ftlgt: dass ein
mftchtiges und aufgeklSlrtes Volk sich zu einer
Repuhlik (die ihrer llatur nach zum ewigen
Frieden geneigt sein muss) "bilden kann, so
giht diese einen Mittelpunkt der fflderativen
Vereinigung f<lr andere Staaten ah, um sich
an sie anzuschliessen und so den Freiheits-
zustand der Staaten gemM,ss der Idee des
Vdlkerrechts zu sichern und sich durch
mehrere Verbindungen dieser Art nach und
nach immer weiter auszubreiten.
Those nations which are not willing to give up war will
yet be persuaded to cooperate in the establishment of a
confederation for the sake of their own interests. This
is effected hy the commercial spirit ¥/hich cannot exist
along with war." Thus all nations find themselves
moving toward peace, although sometimes not directly




2. THE POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS OF NIETZSCHE
Origin and essence of the state, Nietzsche built
his social philosophy on the principle of power. It is
historical nonsense to call the state the people "because
it originated without the consent of the people and
without a contract. The state is the result of military
conquest and organization.
Ich gelDrauche das Wort Staat": es versteht
sich von selbst, wer damit geraeint ist--irgend-
ein Rudel hlonder Rauhtiere, eine Eroherer- und
Herren- Rasse, v/elche, kriegerisch organisiert
und mit der Kraft zu organisieren, unbedenklich
ihre furchfbaren Tatzen auf eine der Zahl nach
vielleicht ungeheuer -flherlegene, aher noch
gestaltlose, noch schweifende Sevdlkerung
legt..,Jene Sch^armerei ist abgetan, welche
ihn mit einem Vertrage" heginnen liess.^
Yet the military origin of the state does not force
Nietzsche to condemn it as an institution. It is an
ingenious arrangement for the protection of individuals,
"but it becomes immoral if it crushes the individuality
of its members. If one exaggerates the cultivation of
the state the individual will be destroyed and its
original purpose be frustrated.
Der Staat ist eine kluge Veranstaltung
zum Schutz der Individuen gegeneinander:
tlbertreibt man seine Veredelung, so wird
zuletzt das Individuura durch ihn geschwftcht.






ja aufgeldJst ,--also der uirspnangliche Zv:eck
des Staates am griUndlichsten vereitelt.2
Throughout his social philosophy ITietzsche reacts
violently against any overextension of authority on the
part of human society. The state is always immoral
"because it aims at correct attitudes, normality, and
mediocrity which will enable the greatest number of
people to live peacefully together in the greatest
happiness. It is an enemy of everything exceptional
and progressive.
Der Staat oder die organisierte Unmoralitftt ,
—
inwendig: als Polizei, Strafrecht, StgUide,
PTandel, ITamilie; auswendig: als v7ille zur
Macht, zum Kriege, zur Eroberung, zur Rache.
The state as organized immorality is the coldest of
4
all cold monsters. There is nothing that Nietzsche
despises more than the rule of the masses. The
individual must not be identified with the crowd.
State and society are justified only as means of
producing superior men.
Die Herde ist liittel, nicht mehrl Aber
jetzt versucht man, die Herde als Individuum
zu verstehen und ihr einen hiJheren Rang als









Forms of p-overnment. Apart from the fact that
Nietzsche despised the rule of the masses there are
two more reasons for his rejection of the democratic
form of government. First, any state wants its
neigh"boring state to be a republic for the sole reason
that it assumes that this form of government ma.kes the
other nation weaker, more distracted, and less fit for
•war.
Der eine Staat will also die Verdunkelung
von ITillionen KdJpfen eines anderen Staates,
um seinen Vorteil aus dieser Verdunkelung
zu Ziehen. Ss ist dies dieselbe Qesinnung,
welche die republiks,ni sche Regierungsform
des nachbarlichen Staates. ., a.us dera alleinigen
Grunde unterstiStzt , weil sie von dieser an-
nimmt, dass sie das Volk schv-^^lcher , zerris-
sener und kriegsunffthiger ma.che,^
Second, the democratization of Europe is an
involuntary process of making material and spiritual
tyrants.
Die Beraokratisierung Europas ist zugleich
eine unfrei^rillige Yeranstaltung zur
Ztlchtigung von Tyrannen,— das \7ort in jedera
Sinne ver stand en, auch im gei stigsten.
It is the aim of the modern politicians to multiply
and to protect the inferior elements of the race






ITietzsche's fight against the vulgarizing tendencies
of moc'ern socialist society can easily be understood if
one considers his love for excellence and his longing to
see strong and superior individuals. The trouble with
socialism is that it vdll v;eaken the individual by
creating an abundance of laziness '^hich will finally lead
to calamity. The workingraan's healthy instincts will be
undermined and a feeling of dissatisfaction will give
room to a feeling of revenge. In a healthy state, however,
dissatisfaction is the great stimulus of life and not of
revenge.
Diese Unbefriedigung, statt das Leben zu
verleiden, ist das grosse Stiraulans des Lebens.^
Denn dass der Hensch erlflst v/erde von der
Rache: das ist mir die Brficke zur hSchsten
Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen nach langen
Unwettem. 10
All democratic and socialistic forms of government make
the mistake of trying to advance the masses all at once,
which cannot be done. Man as a species does not progress
at all.
Der Mensch als Gattung ist nicht ira Fort-
schritt .11
Bass die Gattungen einen Fortschritt dar-









Inc'ividuial effort and not a complicated form of
government made us free and will continue to make us
still freer. Therefore Fietzsche demands as little
13
state as possilDle. "So wenig als raflglich Staatl"
Socialism wants "so viel Staat y'ie mdJglich," Nietzsche
"so wenig Staat wie rndglich,"^^
The ideas and doings of nations are infinitely
less important than the ideas and doings of exceptional
individuals. The masses are conservative and would
hardly make any progress if single master individuals
would not demonstrate new ways of advancement. The
goal of humanity lies in its highest types.
Das Ziel der ITenschheit kann nicht am Snde
liegen, sondem nur in ihren hdchsten
Exemplaren.15
Ich lehre euch den Uetermenschen . Der
Mensch ist etwas, das ^Iherwunden werden soil.
Tas haht ihr getan, ihn zu ffberwinden?
Alle Tesen l^isher schufen etwas tther sich
hinaus: und ihr wollt die Ehhe dieser
grossen Flut sein und lieher noch zura Tiere
zurflckgehen, als den Menschen TH"ber^dnden?16
The onlzr hope for humanity lies in the quality of its
17
men and m action. True progress is threatened m







average rather than the distinguished men its first
TO
ohject. In the place of the present man must step
the master of the earth, the discoverer and creator
of new values v/ho suffers from no disharmony.
Die hisherigen Aristokraten, geistliche
und T^reltliche, hevreisen nichts gegen die
Notv/endigkeit einer neuen Ari stokratie.
"'Ve do not want to "be ruled hy counts, earls, and dukes,
20hut hy our ablest men. In the ITietzschean state of
efficient aristocracy the success of those v/ho are
wisest mentally and strongest phy si easily would he
guara.nteed. Since there is hardly any governmental
interference, the race would make rapid progress and
the strong could grow stronger and stronger, whereas
the weak would hecome more and more obedient. By these
strong individuals Fietzsche does not mean capitalistic
21
exploiters who accumulate large fortunes, but capable
leaders under whom the workingmen are glad to work for
progress,
Es ist seltsam, dass die Unterv/erfung unter
maichtige, furchterregende, ja schreckliche
Personen, unter Tj^rannen und Heerfiahrer, bei
we it em nicht so peinlich empfunden wird als
diese Untenverfung unter unbekannte und un-







der Industrie sind: in dem ArbeitgelDer sieht
der Arbeiter gewflhnlich nur einen listigen,
aussaugenden, auf alle Not spekulierenden
Hund von Menschen. • .Den Fa"brikanten, . .fehlten
bisher wahrscheinlich allzusehr alle jene
Formen und Abzeichen der hiJheren Rasse.22
Everyone can "become a leader in human society if
he performs mighty deeds of intellectual and physical
daring. This gigantic exploitation of human labor
finds its justification in the creation of superior
men. If we want this end then we must also agree to
the means, namely the victory of the stronger and the
downfall of the weaker. All races and all people are
under obligation to strive to produce valuable
individuals.
vaiker und Rassenj sie bilden den „ Leib"
zur Erzeugung von einzelnen wertvollen
Individuen, die den grossen Prozess fort-
setBen.23
Principles of political right. Although Metzsche
built his whole political philosophy on the principle
of power, he is not a blind worshipper of brutal force.
Immer noch liegt man vor der Kraft auf den
Knien—nach alter Sklaven-Gewohnhei t—und
doch ist, wenn der Grad von Verehrungswflrdig-
keit festgestellt werden soil, nur der Grad












Veneration depends on reason and not on false promises,
Wenn man der Bestie iDlutige Fleischstflcke
aus der ITfthe zeigt und wieder wegzieht, "bis
sie endlich "brtlllt: meint ihr, dass dies
Gebrflll Gerechtigkeit bedeute?25
Justice is not equality of rights, comfort, security,
and physical well-being ("das allgemeine gnSne Weide-
Gltflclc der Herde")?^ "but exchange under the presuppos-
ition of an almost equal "balance of power,
Gerechtigkeit ist also "Vergeltung und
Austausch unter der "Voraussetzung einer
ungeffthr gleichen Macht stellung. 27
Nietzsche does not want to "be mistaken for a
preacher of equality simply "because men are not equal
and they should not "become equal.
Hit den Predigern der Gleichheit will ich
nicht vermischt und verwechselt sein, Denn
so redet mir die Gerechtigkeit; » die Men-
schen sind nicht gleich,"
Und sollen es auch nicht werdenl^^
Vor dem P<)"bel a"be3r wollen wir nicht gleich
sein ,29
This inequality of kind must carry with it inequality
of rights. Superior men should have more privileges
"because they have more duties. It is in this sense





.^sZ,II, Von den Taranteln, 100; cf. Von den
29Gelehrten, 127.




als Eroberungen. We are not equal f iDut rights may "be
achieved by everyone,
A social order depends on the intelligence and
the character of its leadership. Blind fanatics desire
to change from high to low or to an equality. This is
the same as if we would outroot the plant of culture and
put its top into the ground while the root may enjoy the
sun. The demand for equality is suicidal, rhetorical,
and insincere. Rights depend on personal achievements.
y^y right is that part of my power which others have
granted me and in which they intend to preserve me.
Meine Rechte: das ist jener Teil meiner
Macht, den mir die anderen nicht nur zuge-
standen hahen, sondem in welchem sie raich
erhalten wollen.31
However, the granting of power depends entirely on
personal qualifications. It must he emphasized in this
connection that Nietzsche opposed all forms of exclu-
siveness. The true masters must he willing and eager
to welcome to their rank all who display the qualities
which make a man extraordinarily fit and efficient. It







The worth of a thing often depends on the diffi-
culty in getting it. The struggle for liberty has
developed strength, courage, and resourcefulness in the
human race. It would he wrong, however, to waste this
precious achievement on those who are not worthy of it.
Only superior men should "be allowed to give their will
to power free expression "because everything they do
will contri"bute to the advancement of the human race.
Nur dem veredelten Menschen darf die
Freiheit des Geistes gege"ben werden,'52
Superior men have perfect insight in the laws of nature
and consequently should "be free to express their
thoughts.
It would be a serious mistake to "believe that
Nietzsche did not respect the aspirations of the working
class "because he did not wish them to have complete
freedom of expression. He never deceived the la"borer
with false hopes "but tried to improve his condition
"by a "better leadership. Only the master must have a
difficult life "because his highest aims grow out of
his deepest discontentments. Anyone who wants happiness
should "be free to pursue it.
Dem Individuum, sofern es sein Glflck will,




Glflck geben: denn das individuelle GlUck quillt
aus eigenen, jedermann un"bekannten Gesetzen,
es kann mit Vorschriften von aussen her nur
verhindert, gehernrat werden.^S
The violent instinct must "become weaker and justice
should increase in everything. Instead of revolution and
violence ITietzsche advocated gradual change,
Nicht gewaltsame neue Verteilungen, sondem
allmAhliche neue Umschaffungen des Sinnes tun
not, die Gerechtigkeit muss in alien grdsser
werden, der gewalttatige Instinkt schw^cher,
Hierhei ist nichts mehr zu wflnschen als
Vorsicht und langsame Entwickelung. 35
Dass also ein Umsturz wohl eine Kraftquelle
in einer matt gewordenen Menschheit sein kann,
nimmermehr alDer ein Ordner, Baumeister,
Ktlnstler, Vollender der menschlichen Fatur.^^
Inzwischen wAchst und wflchst die organi-
sierende, die zur Herrschaft "berufne Idee"
in der Tiefe,— sie heginnt zu "befehlen, sie
leitet langsam aus fTehenwegen und Ahwegen
zunSck, sie loereitet einzelne Qualitaten
und Tflchtigkeiten vor, die einmal als Mitt el
zum Ganzen sich unenthehrlich erweisen
werden,37
However, there are instances in which we ought to
honor a revolutionist for having wakened us out of
our slumher in which we did not see the weaknesses
in our social structure.
Es giht Faile, wo man einen solchen Auf-
standischen darum selhst zu ehren hfttte.
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weil er an unsrer Gesellschaft etwas empfindet,
gegen das der Krieg not tut:—wo er uns aus
dem Schluramer weckt.38
The meaning of war and its purpose. Much has "been
said a"bout Nietzsche *s attitude towards war, but few
interpreters realize that he used the term in many
different senses.
There are a number of passages in which ITietzsche
makes certain remarks concerning war as a historical
fact. He admits that sometimes wars are necessary in
order to awaken the lazy masses of humanity,
Einstweilen kennen v/ir keine anderen
Mitt el, wodurch mattwerdenden Vfllkern
jene rauhe Energie des Feldlagers, jener
tiefe unpers^nliche Hass, jene M<)rder-
KaltbKltigkeit mit gut em Gewissen, jene
geraeinsarae organisierende Glut in der
Vernichtung des Feindes, jene stolze
GleichgTSltigkeit gegen grosse Verluste,
gegen das eigene Dasein und das der
Befreundeten, jenes dumpfe erdhebenhafte
Erschtlttern der Seele ehenso stark und
sicher mitgeteilt werden kflnnte, wie
dies jeder grosse Krieg tut, 39
Yet it is onlj'" his contempt for mediocrity and conserva-
tism that makes him favor war, ITietzsche* s own personal
opinion is clearly demonstrated when he spoke about the





masses that are driven by their desire to rule, thus
enalDling an ambitious prince to rush into war with
the good conscience of his people as his excuse,
Es kommt immer wieder die Stunde, wo die
llasse, • .hereit ist...als siegreiche,
tyrannisch willlcSrliche ITation ^Iher and re
Nationen zu schalten, . .dass der ehrgeizige
Oder klug vorsorgende Ftlrst einen Krieg
vom Zaune "brechen und das gute Gewissen
des Volkes seinem Unrecht unterschiehen
kann. Die grossen Eroherer hahen immer
die pathetische Sprache der Tugend im
Munde gefflhrt . . .Wunderliche Tollheit der
moralischen Urteilel40
Krieg, , .macht den Sieger dumm, den
Besiegten ho shaft. 41
Der grdJsste Uachteil der jetzt so ver-
herrlichten Volksheere hesteht in der
Vergeudung von Menschen der hdchsten
Zivilisation; nur durch die Gunst aller
Verhaitnisse giht es deren Hherhaupt,--
wie sparsam und angstlich sollte man mit
ihnen umgehen, da es grosser Zeitrftume
hedarf, urn die zufftlligen Bedingungen
zur Erzeugung so zart organisierter
Gehime zu schaffenl42
On the other hand Nietzsche's v/hole philosophy
of the transvaluation of values is called the great
war and the hook Gflt zen^Dftrnmerung "eine grosse Kriegs-









is contempt. It is the ^B.r without gunpowder, smoke,
and strained ligaments.
Wo man verachtet, kann man nicht Krieg
f<lhren.
.
. Ich greife nie Personen an...
Ich greife nur Dinge an,'^^
Ss ist der Krieg, aber der Krieg ohne
Pulver und Dampf, ohne kriegerische
AttitT!lden, ohne Pathos und verrenkte
Gliedmassen.46
This war against superstition and unreasoning faith
with their long tra,in of fears, horrors, doubts, frauds,
and injustices should he the duty of every man, in order
to prepare the way for an age in which heroism is carried
into knowledge and wars are waged for ideas and their
consequences.
Suren Peind sollt ihr suchen, euren Krieg
sollt ihr f<lhren und fflr eure Gedankeni Und
wenn euer Ged anke unterliegt, so soli eure
Redlichkeit dartlber noch Triumph rufeni
Ihr sollt den Prieden liehen als Mittel
zu neuen Kriegen, . .Eure Arbeit sei ein
Kampf, euer Priede sei ein 3iegl47
Denn es soil einem noch hflheren Zeitalter
den 'J7eg bahnen und die Kraft einsammeln,
welche jenes einmal niJtig haben wird,--
jenes Zeitalter, das den Keroismus in die
Erkenntnis trftgt und die Kriege f<lhrt um
der Gedanken und ihrer Folgen willen.48
This peace, which is a mes^ns to new wars, has often
been interpreted as proving 17ietzsche*s warlike
45
^
Eh, Warura ich so weise bin, 7,
.^Eh, Menschliches Allzumenschliches, 1,
AsZ, Vom Kriege und vom Kriegsvolke, 45; cf. PW, 11,92.




attitude, but the context deals with spiritual war for
which a period of preparation is as essential as in any
other struggle of achievement.
The racial and national prohlem. (^uite in agreement
with Fietzsche's attacks on war are his ohjections to
racialism and nationalism. It is the sign of a strong
nation to "break national self-conceit, A weak nation
develops into a prison house.
Wenn nftmlich ein Volk vorwflrtsgeht und
wftchst, so sprengt es jedesmal den G^lrtel,
der ihra his dahin sein nationales Ansehen
gah; hleiht es stehen, verkflraraert es, so
schliesst sich ein neuer Gflrtel um seine
Seele; die immer hftrter werdende Kruste "baut
gleichsam ein Gefftngnis herum, dessen Mauem
immer wachsen,49
Nationalism is something terrihly artificial and would
not be able to maintain itself if it would not use
slyness, lies, and oppression in order to hold its
prestige,
Gibt es irgendeinen Gedanken hinter diesem
Homv i eh-Hat i onal i srau s?50
Dieser kflnstliche Nationalisraus ist tlbrigens
so gefahrlich, wie der ktlnstliche Katholizismus







gewaltsaraer Not- und "Relagerungszustand , welcher
von ¥enigen tlber Viele verhAngt ist, und braucht
List, Lflge und Gevralt, urn si oh in Ansehen zu
halt en ,51
Diese kulturwidrigste Krankheit und Unvernunft,
die es gibt, den TTationalismus, diese nevrose
nationale , an der Europa krank ist, diese
Verewigung der Kleinst aaterei Europas, der
kleinen Politik: sie haben Europa selbst ura
seine yernunft--6ie haben es in eine Sackgasse
gebracht . --Wei ss jemand ausser mir einen Weg
aus dieser Sackgasse?. • .Eine Aufgabe, gross
genug, die Vfllker wieder zu binden?52
ITationalisra has robbed the Europeaji nations of their
common sense. Yet IJietzsche is sure that the destructive
work of nationalism will force the nations of Europe into
cooperation. Tith this hope in mind he says that we ought
to meet racial self-glorification with the term "Wir
guten Europaer."
Dank der krankhaften Entfreradung, welche der
Nationalitats-Wahnsinn zwischen die Vfllker
Europas gelegt hat und noch legt, dank ebenfalls
den Politikem des kurzen Blicks und der raschen
Hand, die heute mit seiner Hilfe obenauf sind
und gar nicht ahnen, wie sehr die auseinander-
Idsende Politik, welche sie treiben, notv/endig
nur Zwischenakts-Politik sein kann,--d8Jik alle-
dem und manchem heute ganz Unaussprechbaren
werden jetzt die unzweideutigsten .'^zeichen
tlbersehn Oder willktlrlich und l^genhaft umge-
deutet, in denen sich ausspricht, dass Europa
Eins werden will, 53
;.^MA,I,viii,475,






TTationalism has been preserved mainly* in the
interest of certain royal dynasties. In fact, we are
not Oerman enough to advocate nationalism and race
hatred, or to talce delight in that national "blood-
poisoning which sets up quarantines between the
nations of Europe, Therefore we should fearlessly
style ourselves good Europeans and labor actively
for the amalgamation of all nations including the
Sobald es sich nicht mehr um Konservierung
von Hationen, sondem um die Erzeugung einer
mflglichst krkftigen europftischen Mischrasse
handelt, ist der Jude als Ingredienz ebenso
brauchbar und erwtfnscht als irgendein anderer
nationaler Rest.,,Hat man dies einraal erkannt,
so soil man sich nur als guten Europ^er aus-
geben und durch die Tat an der Verschmelzung
der Nationen arbeiten.54
Since God does not do this work for us, we ourselves
must aim at goals that embrace the v;hole world
("m<issen die Menschen selber sich iJkumenische, die
ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen").
Hat man dies einraal erkannt, so soil man sich
nur ungescheut als guten Europ^er ausgeben und








'LlA,I,viii,475; cf. JGB,VI,208, W,V,377,
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Das Europa sich ent schliessen ra<lsste,,.,
Sinen Willen zu "bekomraen. . . damit endlich die
langgesponnene KoradJdie seiner Kleinstaaterei
.••zu einem Abschluss kftme.57
Those ^ho are best qualified for this task are Heimat-
58lose. They are the forerunners of a united Europe
"because their race is mixed and their spirit is free
from racial self-admiration.
Wir Heimatlose, wir sind der Rasse und
Ahkunft nach zu vielfach und gemischt, sis
raoderne Menschen", und folglich wenig
versucht, an jener verlogenen Rassen-
^Selhsthewunderung und Unzucht teilzunehmen
.
These homeless people are generous, rich in spirit, and
conquerors. While ITapoleon was the forerunner of the
idea of a united Europe, hut tried to establish it hy
force, these Heimatlosen work on the basis of natural
law.
^'jrrB,VI,208.
58asZ,IV, der Schatten; F77,V,377; JGB, VII, 241.
59w,V,377; cf. 362.

THE RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION
Kant
1, Natural capacities can
"be completely dcYeloped
only in the species and
not in the individual,
2, Love of glory, of gain,
and of power are essential
to progress.
3, The state is a product
of reason and established
in the interest of all.
4, The state is a people
which rules itself.
5. Every citizen is a
lav/maker.
6. Peraocracy is a despotism
because the majority decides
against the minority.
7. The fewer the number of
rulers and the greater the
representation embodied in
them, the more does the
constitution harmonize with
republicanism.
8. Right will ultimately
triumph.
Nietzsche
1, Man as a species does
not progress at all. The
goal of humanity lies in
its highest types,
2, The will to power is
the universal law of life.
3. The state is the result
of military conquest and
organization. It is necessary
for the protection of the
individual, but its importance
should not be exaggerated.
4. The state is organized
immorality.
5. Only master individuals





7. In an efficient aristocracy
the success of those who are
wisest mentally and strongest
physically would be guaranteed.
8. The violent instincts must




9, The essence of right consists
in the limitation of the freedom
of each individual corresponding
•u^ith the equally limited freedom
of all others.
9. My right is that part
of my power which others
have granted me and in which
they intend to preserve me.
10, The state is not Justified 10, As little state as
in limiting the freedom of the possiblel
individual further than regard
for the maintenance of right
demands.
11, ITo one can force another
person to "become happy in the
way in which he expects to find
happiness,
12, It should he possible for
everyone to obtain any position
to which his talent, industry,
or fortune may "be capable of
raising him,
13, Women, children, and
servants do not enjoy equality
of rights.
14, Freedom not v/ithin the
laws of reason destroys itself.
15, All actions are wrong if
their maxim is not compatible
with publicity.
16, J7e have no right to
rebellion because if it were
publicly professed it would
make its own purpose impossible.
It is the duty of the heads of
the state to improve the consti-
tution so that it may be brought
more and more into conformity
with reason.
11. Anyone v«rho wants
happiness should be free to
pursue it.
12. Everyone can become a
leader in human society if
he performs mighty deeds of
intellectual and physical
daring,
13. The greatest rights
can be given only to the
greatest men,
14. Only superior men may
have the right to express
themselves freely.
15. The masses are always
wrong.





17, A relative security against
alDuse of political power may "be
oTDtained "by dividing the func-
tions of government into legis-
lative, executive, and judicial
departments.
18, A long peace tends to
"breed self-interest, cowardice,
and eff eminacj''.
19, The achievement of peace
is the entire purpose of
jurisprudence and a confedera-
tion of all nations is the
solution of the international
pro"blem.
20, War makes man a means
and thus counteracts the
purpose of nature.
17. The only hope for
humanity lies in the
quality of its men.
18. V7ar might sometimes "be
necessary in order to awaken
the lazy mass of humanity.
19. We should fearlessly
style ourselves good
Europeans and la"bor for the
amalgamation of all nations
including the Jews.
20. War wastes men of the
highest civilization.
The central element of Kant s political philosophy is
the concept of freedom within the laws of the state. Censor-
ship and for'bidding of criticism will result in injury to
intellectual progress. The state should represent the
interests of all. All actions are wrong if they are not
compati"ble with pu"blicity. It is the duty of the represen-
tatives of the people to "bring the constitution into
conformity with reason. Mankind is steadily progressing.
A federation of nations will "be the final solution of the
international pro'blem.
The chief emphasis in Nietzsche* s political philosophy
is upon the fact that if a government cannot develop
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sufficient nobility of character in its leadership it
is doomed to failure. If one glorifies the state and
weakens the power of the individual, the original
purpose of the state will "be frustrated. In an effi-
cient aristocracy the success of those who are wisest
mentally and strongest physically would he guaranteed.
Narrow racialism and hlind nationalism stand in the
way of a united Europe.
Kant and ITietzsche would agree that strong and
superior leaders are needed in an ideal government.
If a state is largely ruled by the vulgar and common-
place it will perish from the very complexity and
difficulties of its problems. Social changes must
proceed in accordance with existing and amendable
laws. The final product of political activity should
be a union of nations.
3 Ji.
CHAPTER IV
THE AESTHETIC CO^TCEPTIONS OF KANT AUD NIETZSCHE
In Nietzsche* s life TDeauty played a more
prominent role than in the life of the very reasonable
Kant. For him "beauty is the supreme purpose of
existence, whereas for Kant heauty is (disconnected
from all interest and placed into the realm of pure
contemplation.
1. THE AESTHETIC CONCEPTIONS OF KANT
PurposiTeness without purpose. The theoretical
reason cannot pass from the realm of nature to the
supra- sensuous province of freedom. It is the task
of freedom, however, to realize ends in the sensi*ble
world. Consequently nature must "be so conceived as
to make it possible for ends to "be realized.
Der Preiheitsbegriff soil den durch seine
Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt
wirklich machen, und die Natur muss folglich
auch so gedacht werden kflnnen, dass die
Gesetzraftssigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur
Mflglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke
nach Freiheitsgeset zen zusammenstimme.l




Vvdthout purpose. Through the conception of conformity
to purpose in nature, the faculty of judgment mediates
the transition from the realm of nature to the realm
of freedom,
Es ist also wenigstens vorlftufig zu ver-
muten, dass die Urteilskraft. . , einen Ueher-
gang vom reinen Srkenntnisvermdgen, d.i.
vora Grehiete der TTaturhegriffe, zura Gehiete
des Freiheitshegriff s hewirken werde, als
sie im logischen Gehrauche den Hehergang
vom Verstande zur Vernunft radJglich macht.2
Kant distinguished two kinds of conformity to
purpose, Suhjective conformity to purpose is founded
on the immediate pleasure we take in the form of the
ohject, in merely reflecting upon it.
Wir hahen gesehen: dass die Vorstellung
der Zweckmftssigkeit der ersteren Art auf
der unraittelbaren Lust an der Form des
Gegenstandes in der hlossen Reflexion tlber
sie "beruhe.S
Ohjective conformity to purpose, on the other hand,
does not deal with the feeling of pleasure derived
from the contemplation of things, "but with the under-
standing in its judgment of things.
Die. . .Zweckmftssigkeit der zweiten Art...




den T)ingen, sondem mit dem Verstande in
Beurteilung derselben zu tun,
4
\7e recognize in art an immediate pleasure in the
form of the object, iDut do not TDring our notion of
the beautiful object through the understanding into
relation with the object. Through the faculty of
imagination we bring our notion of the beautiful into
relation ^)ith ourselves.
Um zu unterscheiden, ob etwas schfln sei
Oder nicht beziehen wir die Vorstellung
nicht durch den Ver stand auf das Objekt
zum Erkenntnisse, sondern durch die Ein-
bildungskraft (vielleicht mit dem Verstande
verbunden) auf das Subjekt und das Geftlhl
der Lust Oder ITnlust desselben.^
Absence of desire is therefore the very essence of
aesthetic enjojnnent. The more in the contemplation
of an object we forget the actual conditions about us
the deeper will be our enjo3rment. It is the purpose
of art to give man his true inner freedom.^ Art is
free creation.
Von Rechts wegen sollte man nur die
Hervorbringung durch Freiheit, d.i.
durch eine Willkflr, die ihren Kandlungen







The meaning of the "beautiful. The faculty of
judging the beautiful is taste. Judgments of taste
are not logical, "but aesthetic. Taste is merely a
regulative faculty of judging the form in connection
g
with the manifold in the power of the imagination.
Thus heauty can only he a form of the reaction of the
Q
mind upon impressions received from within or without.
It is the object of disinterested pleasure and arises
from pure contemplation.
Das Wohlgefalien, welches das Geschraacks-
urteil bestimmt ist ohne alles Interesse.lO
Beauty may therefore he defined as a form of the
conformity of an object to purpose in so far as it is
perceived without purpose.
Schflnhelt ist Form der ZweckmSlssigkeit
eines Gegenstandes, sofem sie ohne Vor-
stellung eines Zwecks an ihm wahrgenommen
v/ird.ll
Since satisfaction derived from the beautiful
is disinterested and free, it cannot rest on conditions
peculiar to the individual, but only on that which






Venn das, wovon jemand sich "bewusst ist,
dass das Wohlgefallen an demsel"ben tei ihm
sel"bst ohne alles Interesse sei, das kann
derselTDe nicht anders als so beurteilen,
dass es einen Grund des Wohlgefaliens f<lr
jederraann enthalten mtlsse.12
The fact that we are able to make judgments of taste
presupposes a community sense. The beautiful pleases
and presents a claim to the assent of all.
Diese unbestimrate ITorm eines Gemeinsinns
wird von uns wirklich vorausgesetzt ; das
beweist unsere Anmassung, Geschmacksurteile
zu fallen. 13
Das Sch(3ne ist das, was ohne Begriffe
als Objekt eines allgemeinen Wohlgefaliens
vorgestellt wird. 14
This universality, however, cannot be objective.
It must be subjective because beauty cannot be
derived from conceptions. There is no rule according
to which one must recognize something as beautiful,
Wenn man Objekte bloss nach Begriffen
beurteilt, so geht alle Vorstellung der
Schflnheit verloren. Also kann es auch
keine Regel geben, nach der jemand gendJtigt
werden sollte, etwas ftir schiJn anzuerkennen, ^5
Eine flsthetische Idee kann keine
Erkenntnis werden, weil sie eine Anschauung
(der Einbildungskraft ) ist, der nieraals







If we compare the beautiful with the good this
characteristic is made clear. The good is prized
"because an objective worth is attributed to it.
It is recognized by every intelligent being. The
beautiful, on the other hand, merely pleases and
exists only for men.
Angenehm heisst Jemandem das, was ihn
vergnttgt; schtfn, was ihm bloss gefftllt;
gut, was geschatzt, gebilligt, d.i. worin
von ihm ein objektiver ¥ert gesetzt wird.^'''
The meaning of the sublime. For the beautiful in
nature we must seek a ground outside of us. It pleases
without interest. For the sublime, however, we must
seek a ground within us. Thought introduces sublimity
into the idea of nature,
Zum Schflnen der Fatur mflssen wir einen
Grund ausser uns suchen, zum Erhabenen
aber bloss in uns und der Denkungsart,
die in die Vorstellung der ersteren
Erhabenheit hineinbringt . ^8
Erhaben ist das, was durch seinen Widerstand
gegen das Interesse der Sinne unraittelbar
gefailt.19
Although sublimity is that which gives an immediate







senses, it is yet nothing objective. The sublime
cannot be contained in any sensible form. It is con-
fined solely to the ideas of reason.
Das eigentliche Erhabene kann in keiner
sinnlichen Form enthalten sein, sondem
trifft nur Ideen der Vernunft, welche,
obgleich keine ihnen angeraessene Darstel-
lung miJglich ist, eben durch diese
Unangemessenheit , welche sich sinnlich
darstellen Iftsst, rege gemacht und ins
Gemflt gerufen we rden. 20
Das Erhabene (sublime) ist die ehrfurcht-
erregende Grossheit (magnitude reverenda)
dem Umfange oder dem Grade nach, zu dera
die Annftherung (urn ihm mit seinen Kr^ften
angemessen zu sein) einladend, die Furcht
aber, in der Vergleichung mit demselben
in seiner eigenen Schfttzung zu verschwinden
zugleich abschreckend ist,^^
Kant distinguished between the mathematically
and the djmamically sublime. The mathematically
sublime, on which the imagination expends in vain
all its power of comprehension, is great beyond every
sensible standard of measurement. It involves a
feeling of pleasure when every sensible standard of





Erha"ben ist das, mit welchera in Vergleichung
alles andere klein ist. 22
Srha"ben ist das, was auch nur denken zu
kflnnen ein Vermflgen des Gemttts TDeweist, das
jeden MassstalD der Sinne i9bertrifft . 23
Das GefiShl des Erhabenen ist also ein
Gefflhl der Unlust, aujs der TJnangemessenheit
der Sinbildungskraft in der asthetlschen
GriJssenschfttzung durch die Vemunft; und
eine dabei zugleich erweckte Lust, aus der
UelDereinst immung e"ben dieses Urteils der
TJnangemessenheit des grdJssten sinnlichen
Vermflgens rait Vernunftideen, sofem die
Bestrebung zu denselben doch f<lr uns
Gesetz ist. 24
While mathematical sublimity finds pleasure in
the rational idea of the infinite as completed totality,
the dynamically sublime brings before our minds our
independence of all natural powers, ITature is dynam-
ically sublime. It calls into activity a force in us
which does not belong to nature, but which makes our
mind conscious of the exaltation of its destiny.
Die ITatur im ftsthetischen Urteile als
Macht , die fiber uns keine Gewalt hat,
betrachtet, ist dynaraisch-erhaben. 25
The pleasure produced by the sublime, like that






and in quality disinterested. In relation it must
represent subjective conformity to purpose. In
modality it must present this conformity to purpose
as necessary.
Denn als TJrteil der ftsthetischen reflek-
tierenden Urteilskraft , muss das V/ohlge-
falien am Srha-benen ebensowohl als am
Schflnen der ^uantitftt nach allgemeingflltig,
der Qualitat nach ohne Interesse sein, der
Relation nach subjektive Zweckmassigkeit
,
und der Modalitftt nach die letztere als
notwendig vorstellig machen,26
The essence of genius. The idea of purposiveness
without purpose comes to its clearest expression in
genius. Artistic talent is a natural force which creates
purposively yet without design or concepts. Its outstand-
ing feature is originality. Consequently the field of
the imagination is best suited for its activity.
Das eigentliche Feld f«lr das Genie ist das
der Einbildungskraft: weil diese schiJpferi sch
ist und weniger als andere Verraflgen unter dem
Zwange der Regeln steht, dadurch aber der
Originalitat desto ffthiger ist. 27
Thus genius is originality or a native power of the
mind by means of which nature gives rules to art. This
explains why the genius is unable to tell hov/ he has
produced his work. It was not in his power to create
^^KtJ, 79
,
^'''apH,146; cf, KIT, 198,

anything at will or according to a plan. He cannot
even give another person such directions as would
enable him to produce similar results,
Man sieht hieraus, dass Genie.,.wie es sein
Produkt zustande hringe, selbst nicht "be-
schreihen oder wissenschaftlich anzeigen
kdJnne, sondem dass es als Fatu
r
die Regal
gehe; und daher der TJrheher eines Produkt Sf
welches er seinem Genie verdankt, selbst
nicht weiss, wie sich in ihm die Ideen dazu
herbeifinden , auch es nicht in seiner Gewalt
hat, dergleichen nach Belieben oder plan-
mllssig auszudenken und anderen in solchen
Vorschriften mitzuteilen, die sie instand




2. TUE AESTHETIC COl^CAPTIONS OF NIETZSCHE
Art and its purpose. In irietzsche*s philosopl^ art
is of the greatest importance. He himself states that
he gives more credit to artists than to philosophers,
because they loved their senses and the things of this
world.
In der Hauptsache gebe ich den KtStnstlem mehr
recht als alien Philosophen "bisher: sie verloren
die grosse Spur nicht, auf der das Lehen geht,
sie liehten die Dinge dieser Welt", --sie
liehten ihre Sinne.-I-
Sven the most reasonable man needs from time to time a
natural attitude of looking at things. Man cannot
always he logical.
Auch der vermSnftigste Mensch bedarf von Zeit
zu Zeit wieder der ITatur, das heisst seiner
unlogischen Grundstellung zu alien Dingen.2
Der Kflnstler hat in Hinsicht auf das Erkennen
der "Yahrheiten eine schwachere Moralit^t als
der Zenker; er will sich die glftnzenden, tief-
sinnigen Deutungen des Lebens durchaus nicht
nehmen lassen und wehrt sich gegen nl9chterne,
schlichte Methoden und Resultate.3
The whole field of aesthetics begins with man and





olDject and also the ugliest olDject.
Fichts ist BchdJn, nur der Mensch ist schflnj
auf dieser Faivetat niht alle Aesthetik, sie
ist deren erste ^ahrheit, Fflgen wir sofort
noch deren z^eite hinzu: nichts ist hftsslich
als der entartende Mensch,— damit ist das
Reich des ftsthetischen TTrteils umgrenzt,4
After having stated the importance and limitation
of art we ask, what does Nietzsche mean hy art? The
essence of art is completion of existence, fullness,
affirmation, deification of life.
Das 77esentliche an der Kunst "bleiht ihre
DaseinsYollendung, ihr Hervorhringen der
Vollkoramenheit und FiSlle; Kunst ist wesentlich
Bejahung, Segnung, Vergflttlichung des Daseins,^
llietzsche could not conceive art as "being without
a purpose. Art is the great stimulus to life.
Die Kunst ist das grosse Stimulans zum
Lehen: wie kflnnte man sie als zwecklos,
als ziellos, als l^art pour l*art verstehen.^
Uot art for art's sake, hut life for art's sake. Art
cannot he restricted to mere mastery of form, if it
intends to influence man. In order to he ahle to
counteract decadent religion, morality, and philosophy,
art must have the whole man hehind it,'''
pGD, Streifztlge eines Unzeitgemftssen, 20,
^WzM,352.




Unsre Religion, Moral und Philosophie sind
de'cadence-Pormen des Menschen.--Die Gegen-
iDewegung: die Kunst.Q
There is no pessimistic art.^ Although sufferings
and hardships will increase with the growth of culture,
art must praise and glorify. It may be that reality is
ugly, yet art can make even the ugliest reality bearable,-^
The artist must select, choose, and bring into prominence.
It is he who gives us an endless perspective of the
possibilities of achievement which will justify all the
suffering that was necessary to create that radiant
vision.
Die Tiefe des tragi schen KiUnstlers liegt
darin, dass sein Ssthetischer Instinkt die
ferneren Polgen flbersieht, dass er nicht
kurzsichtig beim IT^chsten stehenbleibt, dass
er die Oekonoraie im grossen bejaht, welche
das Purchtbare, 3i)se, Fragvinitrdige recht-
fertigt, und nicht nur— rechtfertigt .
H
Beauty and its creation. Just as in a tree the
warmth of the earth, which feeds the roots, unites with
the light of the sun, which unfolds the blossoms, so do
we need two separate powers in a completed piece of art.
The Dionysic principle is demonstrated in the spring







of sexual excitement forget themselves and thus renew
the original unity of men. The Apollinic principle is
ohserved in the fantastic structure of a dream with its
moderate limitation and liberation from wild excitations.
On the one hand we have the feeling of the unity of the
race, on the other hand we visualize a single and
individual condition whose unity with the innermost
ground of the world reveals itself in a para"bolic
phantom. Without these two principles there cannot
he creation of art. Everyone who has an excess of
vitality which permits him to surmount pessimism and
suffering can create "beauty. Aesthetic value is the
result of abundance, not of need or starvation.
In Hinsicht auf alle Ssthetischen Werte
hediene ich mich jetzt dieser Hauptunter-
scheidung; ich frage in jedem einzelnen
Falle ist hier der Hunger oder der Ueher-
fluss schflpferisch geworden?12
It is impossible for anyone who is exhausted or weak
to receive anything from art, because he cannot con-
tribute anything. He v;ho cannot give, does not receive.
Der Fflchterne, der M<!de, der Brsch<$pfte,
der Vertrocknende (zum Peispiel ein Gelehrter)




weil er die Irtlnstlerische Urkraft, die ITfltigung
des Reichturas nicht hat: wer nicht geten kann,
erapfSlngt auch nichts.13
Our love of beauty is the shaping will,"^^ It is an error
to say that everything is "beautiful as soon as one looks
at it without will or interest.
Derselhe Irrtuin in arte ; als oTd alles schdn
wSre, sohald es ohne -Yillen angeschaut wird.^^
Wo ist SchOnheit? 7o ich rait allem Will en
wollen muss; wo ich liehen und untergehen
will, dass ein Bild nicht nur Bild bleihe,-^^
Man's notion of heauty is the result of his
delight in his ovm existence. He mirrors himself in
things and counts everything beautiful which reflects
his own likeness.
Im Schflnen setzt sich der Mensch als I'ass
der Vollkommenheit ; in ausgesuchten Fftllen
betet er sich darin an.,,Der Mensch glaubt
die Welt selbst mit Schflnheit TUberh^uft,
—
er vergisst sich als deren Ursache. . . Im
Grunde spiegelt sich der Mensch in den
Dingen, er hftlt alles fflr schiJn, was ihm
sein Bild zurflckwirft . 17
Man himself is the creator of beauty. In order to
improve his existence he has to learn to see beauty




JAsZ, ¥on der unbefleckten Erkenntnis, 123,




Ich will immer mehr lemen, das ITotwendige
an den Dingen als das Schflne sehen:— so werde
ich einer von denen sein, welche die Dinge
schiJn machen.18
Beauty is the highest expression of power because
it melts opposites into a unity,
Schdnheit ist deshalb ftir den Ktlnstler etwas
ausser aller Rangordnung, weil in der Sch5n-
heit Gegensfltze gebSlndigt sind, das hdJchste
Zeichen von Macht, nftmlich flher Entgegenge-
setztes,19
Nietzsche summarizes these conceptions in what he thinks
must "be the elements of a genuine tragedy:
Die Grunderlcenntnis von der Sinheit alles
Vorhandenen, die Betrachtung der Individuation
als des Urgrundes des ITehels, die Kunst als
die freudige Hoffnung, dass der Bann der
Individuation zu zerhrechen sei, als die
Ahnung einer wiederhergestellten Einheit.20
The essence of genius. The master class i s by its
strength an aesthetic manifestation of the hi^ er order
in which life is becoming more identical with beauty.
Only the master or genius can know the eternal essence
of art, but merely in so far as he himself can become







TTur soweit der Genius ira Aktus der kftnstlerischen
Zeugung mit jenem Urktlnstler der ^Yelt verschmilzt,
weiss er etwas fiber das ewige We sen der Kunst.21
What then does Nietzsche mean "by genius? The genius
is a master individual who has a super-abundance of power.
By means of it he discovers new ways out of the confusion
of life.
Was ist Genie?—Ein hohes Ziel und die Mittel
dazu wo 11 en. 22
Jemand, der sich auf seinem Wege im Walde v^llig
verirrt hat, aber mit ungemeiner Energie nach
irgendeiner Richtung hin ins Freie strebt, ent-
declct mitunter einen neuen Weg, welchen niemand
kennt: so entstehen die Genies, denen man Origi-
nalitAt nachr<[hmt , 23
The conditions for becoming a genius are therefore
these: First, anyone can become a genius who is willing
to labor over details and things that are usually con-
sidered as being of secondary importance. Second, no
one can reach this goal who does not have continuous
energy, determination, great courage, and the advantage
of an education.
Es sind grosse Manner aller Art zu nennen,










ihrer tewusst ist: sie hatten alle jenen ttlch-
tigen Handwerker-Ernst , welcher erst lernt,
die Teile vollkomraen zu "bilden, bis er es
wagt, ein grosses Ganzes zu machen; sie galDen
sich Zeit dazu, weil sie mehr Lust am Gut-
machen des Kleinen, ^Te"bensftchlichen hatten
als an dem Effekte eines blendenden Ganzen.
Ftlr grosse Geister selbst ist es also
wahrscheinlich nfltzlicher, wenn sie ttber
ihre Kraft und deren Herkunft zur Einsicht
kommen, wenn sie also begreifen, welche
rein menschlichen Eigenschaften in ihnen
zusaramengeflossen sind, welche Gltlcksumst^nde
hinzutraten: also einraal anhaltende Energie,
ent schlossene Flinwendung zu einzelnen
Zielen, grosser perstfnlicher ITut, sodann
das Glflck einer Erziehung, welche die
best en Lehrer, Vorbilder, Methoden fr^h-
zBitig darbot.25
Music and reality. Although Nietzsche did not
agree v/ith Schopenhauer* s philosophy in general, he
accepted his theorj'' of music.
'Vir verstehen also, nach der Lehre Schopen-
hauersj die Musik als die Sprache des Willens
unmittelbar. 27
Music differs from all the other arts in that it is
an immediate copy of the will. For this reason one
may call the world embodied music or embodied will.
Die Musik ist..,darin von alien anderen
Kiflnsten verschieden, dass sie. . .unmittelbar
Abbild des 'Yillens selbst ist und also zu










zu aller Erscheinung das Ding an sich darstellt,
Man kiJnnte demnach die Welt eloensovrohl ver-
kiJrperte Musik, als verkdJrperten Willen nennen.^
Without music life would be an error. "Ohne Musik
pQ
ware das LelDen ein Irrtum. " Only \)j means of music
are we able to experience all at once sublimity, the
deepest insight and the highest consistency. However,
music itself is not deep and meaningful. Its signifi-
cance is due to the interpreting activity of the
intellect.
So zeige sie denn, dass es mflglich ist,
diese drei: Erhabenheit, tiefes und warmes
Licht und die Wonne der hiJchsten ?olgerichtig-
keit auf Einmal zu empfinden.30
An sich ist keine Musik tief und bedeutungs-
voll,,,Der Intellekt selber hat diese
Bedeut samkeit erst in den Klang hineingelegt , ^
Meine Schv/ermut will in den Verstecken und
Abgrflnden der Vollkommenheit ausruhen: dazu
brauche ich Musik. 32
GdT,16; cf. 17.





3. THE KESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION
Kant
1. Judgments of taste are
not logical, but aesthetic.
2. Beauty is disinterested
pleasure. Absence of desire
is the very essence of
aesthetic enjoyment,
3. The beautiful pleases
and presents a claim to the
assent of all.
4. There is no rule
according to vfhich one
must recognize something
as beautiful,
5. For the beautiful in
nature we must seek a
ground without us, w^hereas
for the sublime vrithin us,
6. The sublime is confined
solely to the ideas of
reason,
7. Genius is originality
or a native power of the
mind by means of Thich
nature gives rules to art,
8. The field of genius is
the imagination.
9, Poetry is the highest
of the arts.
Nietzsche
1, Even the most reasonable
man needs from time to time
a natural attitude to things.
2, Beauty is the highest
expression of power. Abundance
of energy is the essence of
aesthetic enjoyment,
3, The beautiful counteracts
decadence and is recognized
only by masters or geniuses,
4, The only rule ^Dy which
to recognize beauty is to
ask whether starvation or
superabundance produced it,
5, Man calls everything
beautiful which reflects
his own likeness.
6, The whole field of
aesthetics begins with man
and ends with man.
7, Genius is productive
vitality, energy, determination,
courage.
8, The field of genius is
that of the shaping v/ill or
purpose,




For Kant the "beautiful is an object of dis-
interested pleasure. It is perceived -vyithout any
accompanying conception of an end to which it is
adapted. Artistic talent is therefore a natural
force which creates purposively, yet without design
or concepts.
For Uietzsche "beauty is an expression of
power. Its purpose is to counteract decadence and
to create an endless perspective of the possihilities
of achievement. Genius is productive vitality.
While Kant*s aesthetics is mostly an
appreciation of nature, Nietzsche's philosophy of art
is intended to overcome pessimism and weakness.
It is the emphasis on purpose that has made ITietzsche
one of the outstanding critics and promoters of art.
TTot poetry, "but music is the direct expression of
the will to power.
(
CHAPTER V
THE RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS OP I^ANT AMD NIETZSCHE
It is well known that both Kant and Nietzsche
attacked all churches and religions "based on statutory-
requirements which established a tyranny over the soul
by means of fear and superstition. The purpose of
this chapter is to present the contributions of these
two philosophers to the cause of religion.
1. THE RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF KANT
The essence of religion. The truth of any
religious belief is to be measured by its harmony
with the moral law. This means that religion must
be both reason and action.
Zura Kirchenglauben wird his tori sche
Gelehrsamkeit zum Religionsglauben bloss
Vernunft erfordert.l
Alles kommt in der Religion aufs Tun an,^
God, who speaks to us through our own practical reason,
simply wants us to be moral. Everything else is fanati






of all our duties as divine coinraands.
Alles, vias ausser dem gut en Lebenswandel
der Mensch noch tun zu kflnnen verraeint,
um Gott v^ohlgefailig zu werden, ist "blosser
Religionswahn und Afterdienst Gottes.4
Religion ist (subjektiv betrachtet) die
Erkenntnis aller unserer Pflichten als
giJttlicher Gebote.5
Religion zu haben ist Pflicht des
Menschen gegen sich selbst,6
Kant desired a religion purged of all history
and of all dogma. His identification of religion
with morality v/as inconsistent with his recognition
of the religious impression made upon us by the
starry heaven.^ Kant may have solved the problem of
9the relation between religion and mechanical science,
but he was unable to recognize a distinctive religious
experience. His religion was the tj'-pical product of
a scientific age and a rationalistic mood."^*^
The existence and the conception of God. Kant
discussed the arguments for the existence of God











the ground that existence is no mark of a concept.
A hundred real thalers contain no more ideal content
than a hundred possible thalers. The existence of a
thing can never he inferred by means of a logically
necessary judgment from the concept of it. In answer
to the cosmological proof he states that we can never
12discover a conditioning factor that is unconditioned.
However, Kant admits that the teleological argument
demonstrates the existence of a world-architect of
great power and wisdom, but not the existence of an
almighty creator,
Der Beweis kflnnte also hdchstens einen
?/eltbaumei ster , der durch die Tauglichkeit
des Stoffs, den er bearbeitet, immer sehr
eingeschrftnkt wftre, aber nicht einen Welt-
sch(!Jpfer, r'essen Idee alles unterworfen
ist, dartun.l3
God is limited by the fitness of the material on
which he rorks. He is the ideal of perfection because
he knows everything, but he actually exists only as the
principle of the becoming of all perfection.
frott aber stellt, w^hrend er als Ideal
der Vollkommenheit das Prinzip des Erkennens










Prinzip des 'Verc'ens aller Vollkomraenhei
t
Tlfberhaupt dar.l4
Even though Kant's conception of God 'became more
and more immanent-!-^ he cUd not give any consideration
1
6
to the possilDility of a finite God. It is TDecause
of his a priori reasoning and his ahsolutism that Kant
was completely unahle to deal with the problem of
evil. He replaced the Leibnizian optimism that this
is the best of all possible v.'orlds "by an evolutionary
optimism, but never explained the existence of evil
and imperfection in the world, '^fhj are there natural
evils, v/hich cannot be called disciplinary, if God
is absolute? V,Tiy did God not create a perfect world?
Kant attempted to answer these questions, but was
unable to give a satisfactory solution. Impurity of
disposition cannot account for cancer, earthquakes,
and hurricanes.
Jesus and Christianity. The greatest handicap
to the progress of religion is the fact of the






good principle in human nature. This evil principle
is nothing else "but a tenc?ency tov/ard impurity of
disposition. Man is inclined, although accepting the
moral law, to make the motive of self-love a condition
of his oToedience to the moral law.^*^ Religion , however
,
requires that man rise above natural propensities and
strive for an ideal which corresponds completely with
the will of God, Such an ideal is Jesus who exists in
God from eternity as an idea of a morally perfect
humanity.
Die in Gott von Ev/igkeit her liegende
Idee der llenschheit in ihrer ganzen ihm
wohlgefailigen moralischen Vollkommenheit . -^3
Dieser allein Gott wohlgefftllige Mensch
ist in ihm von Sv;igkeit her"; die Idee
desselben geht von seinem ¥esen aus; er
ist sofern kein erschaffenes Ding, sondern
sein eingehorener Sohn.19
This ideal of Jesus is to be sought only in reason.
No example of external experience is adequate to
express it.
Diese Idee hat ihre RealitUt in praktischer
Beziehung vollst^ndig in sich selbst. Denn








It is for this reason that Kant did not care
a great deal for doctrines and creeds. He accepted
them only in so far as they serve the moral education
of the people. They are needed hecause people are
still incapable of apprehending rational faith in its
purity. Their value consists therefore in educating
the people away from sensuous motives, so that at
last they may realize the ideal of moral purity which
is given us in Jesus. While striving for this ideal
v;ith all their power they can he sure that God v;ill
supplement their efforts.
Das ¥esentliche und Vortrefflichste von
der Lehre Ghristi ist ehen dieses, dass er
die Summe aller Religion darin setzte,
rechtschaffen zu sein aiis alien Krftften
im Glauhen, d.i, einem unhedingten
Zutrauen, dass Gott alsdann das flhrige
Gute, was nicht in unsrer Gewalt ist
erg^nzen werde.21
ICant^s whole conception of Christianity centers
around his ideal of moral purity. For this reason
he distinguished the real teachings of Jesus from
the reports ahout Jesus.
Ich unterscheide die Lehre Ghristi von
der Fachricht, die wir von der Lehre
Ghristi hahen, und, urn jene rein hera.us-
In a letter to Lavater, April 28, 1775,
I1
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zu"bekoTTimen , suche ich zuviJrderst die
moralische Lehre, abgesondert von alien
neutesta.ment lichen Satzungen herauszu-
ziehen. 22
The essence of Christianity consists therefore
in the moral teachings of Jesus and not in rituals
and established ohservances. ¥e ought to free
ourselves from historical beliefs and only accept
those that are "based on pure practical reason.
Weil indessen jede auf statutari schen
Gesetzen errichtete Kirche nur sofern die
wahre sein kann, als sie in sich ein Princip
enthUlt, sich dem reinen Vemunftglauhen
(als demjenigen, der, wenn er praktisch ist,
in jedem Glauben eigentlich die Religion
ausmacht) hest^ndig zu nSlhern und den
Kirchenglauben (nach dem, was in ihm
historisch ist) mit der Zeit enfbehren zu
kflnnen, so werden v/ir in diesen Gesetzen
und an den Beamten der darauf gegr^llndeten
Kirche doch einen Dienst (cultus) der
Kirche sofern setzen kflnnen, als diese
ihre Lehren und Anordnung jederzeit auf
jenen letzten Zweck (einen (!Jffentlichen
Religionsglauhen ) richten.23
The ideal and the degenerate church. The great
danger of all ecclesiastical institutions is that they
tend to attribute an importance to all kinds of
external observances that does not belong to them.
I^In a letter to Lavater, April 28, 1775.
'=^'^RGV,228; cf. Chamberlain, IK, 11,405.
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The church in its ideal form is an ethical community
of men vrho entirely adopted the will of God as their
will. It is an ethical society subject to divine
moral legislation.
Ein ethisches gemeines ^.Vesen unter der
gdttlichen moralischen Gesetzgehung ist
eine Kirche, welche, sofern sie kein Gegen-
stend miJglicher Erfahrung ist, die unsicht-
hare Kirche hei sst , , .Die sichthare ist die
wirkliche Vereinigung der Menschen zu
einem Ganzen, das mit jenem Ideal zusaramen-
st immt . ^4
The church in its degenerate form promises divine
favor to those who fulfill certain ecclesiastical
requirements although the^r live immorally and ohey
their sensual desires. The Reformation was axi attempt
to free the church from perversions and to proclaim
freedom of conscience. The entire history of the
church v/as such a struggle of the true church against
priestly authority.
The aim of all priestly government is political
power. The priests try to ohtain influence over the
rulers hy showing them the advantages that the state





spiritual discipline has accustomed even the thought
of the people. Unfortunately, in this v/ay the people
themselves "become accustomed to hypocrisy, their
honesty and fidelity are destroyed, and they grow
cunning in avoiding the true performance even of
their political duties.
Y/eil nun ausser diesem Klerus alles tlhrige
Laie ist (das OToerhaupt des politischen
gemeinen Wesens nicht au sgenoraraen ) , so
heherrscht die Kirche zuletzt den Staat,
nicht ehen durch Gewa.lt, sondem durch
Sinfluss auf die Gemdter, flherdem auch
durch Vorspiegelung des TTutzens, den dieser
vorgehlich aus einem unhedingten Grehorsam
soil Ziehen Icflnnen, zu dem eine geistige
Disziplin selbst das Denken des Yolkes
gew<!Jhnt hat; wohei aher unvermerkt die
GewiJhnung an Heuchelei die Redlichkeit
und Treue der TTntertanen untergrftht, sie
zum Scheindienst auch in hTJIrgerlichen
Pflichten ahwitzigt und, wie alle fehler-
haft genomraenen Principien, gerade da,s
Gegenteil von dem hervorhringt , "^as
heahsichtigt war, 25
Kant saw clearly that the hatred of Christianity
on the part of the educated as well as on the part of
the masses is the direct result of the attempts to
employ religion in order to gain worldly power. The
fact that the church has a.lways recovered from such




2. THE RELIGIOUS CONCiiPTIONS OF NIETZiSCHE
The essence of religion. Most people today would
think it "blasphemy to call Nietzsche a religious man.
Yet, v;ho can deny it after carefully examining his
writings. Kis deeply religious nature is revealed m
a poem which he wrote while leaving the high school of
Schulpforta. It was addressed to the unknown God and
ended with these characteristic words:
Ich will dich kennen, rrntekannter , du
tief in raeine Seele Greifender, raein Le"ben
wie ein Sturm Durchschweifender , du IJnfass-
"barer, mir Verv;and terj Ich r/ill dich
kennen, seltst dir dienen.^
These lines were written in his youth and in his man-
hood the same ITietzsche wrote:
Der Begriff Offenharung, in dera Sinn, dass
plfltzlich mit unsftglicher Sicherheit und
Feinheit, etwas sichfbar , h(!)rhar wird, etwas,
das einera im tiefsten erschtlttert und um-
wirft, heschreilot den Tathestand.
2
In these words Nietzsche affirmed the fact of divine
inspiration, although he emphatically denied that
kind of religion which is the result of a doubt as
to the unity of the person "by ascribing everything
;Gedicht in 1863/64.
'Eh, Also sprach Zarathustra, 3.

great in man to God and "by blaming man for everything
miserable and weak. The unity of the person is the
basis for any sound religion.
Der Mensch hat eine wahre ¥ollust darin,
sich durch iSbertriebene Ansprittche zu ver-
ge'valtigen unci dieses tyrannisch fordernde
Etvras in seiner Seele nachher zu vergflttern.
In jeder asketischen Moral betet der Mensch
einen Teil von sich als Crott an und hat dazu
n(!3tig, den <lbrigen Teil zu diabolisieren. 3
Religion ist eine Ausgeburt eines
Zweifels an der Einheit der Person,
^
Prom these statements it becomes clear v/hy Fietzsche
7
rejected the religion of Pascal. Ke did not believe
that the heart has reasons which the head does not
know.
¥hat then does Nietzsche mean by religion?
He says that religion is a form of thankfulness and
as such a way of living. "Ein neuer V/andel, nicht
ein neuer Glaube."^
Religion. .. ist eine Form der Dankbarkeit,
Man ist ftlr sich selber ^dankbar: dazu
braucht man einen Gott.^
7/e are sometimes so overv/^helmed by gratitude for good








giving. It is therefore impossible to understand
religion scientifically.
Eine Religion die durch und durch wissen-
schaftlich erkannt werden soli, ist am
ICnde dieses 'Veges zugleich vernichtet.8
Religion is faith in the infinite possiloilities of
Eine Religion, die von alien Stunden eines
Menschenlebens die letzte ftftr die wichtigste
hftlt, die einen Schluss des ErdenlelDens
tlTDerhaupt voraussagt und alle Lebenden ver-
urteilt, im fi^nften Akt der TragiJdie zu
lelDen, regt gewiss die tiefsten und edelsten
Kraft e auf, aJoev sie ist feindlich gegen
alles ITeu-anpflanzen, Kdhn-versuchen,
Frei-'begehren.S
Instead of escaping from life it is the sign of all
great religions to overcome epidemics of inertia and
lack of vitality.
Denn allgemein gesprochen: "bei alien
grossen Religionen handelt es sich in der
Hauptsache urn die SekSjnpfung einer gewissen
zur Spidemie gev/ordnen LMdigkeit und
Schwere.lO
There is no basis for the belief that Nietzsche
intended to take religion away from the people. On
the contrary, he pointed out the benevolent effects








Religion und religidlse Bedeut sarakeit ces LeTDens
legt Sonnenglanz auf solche irnraer p:eplagte
Menschen und macht ihnen sel'bst den eignen AnlDlick
ertrSlglich, sie wirkt, wie eine epiloirische
Philosophie auf Leidende hflheren Ranges zu vrirken
pflegt, erquickend, verfeinernd, das Leiden
gleichsam ausntltzend, zuletzt gar heiligend und
rechtfertigend .
H
^Tietzsche gives religion a definite place in life.
He criticizes certain forms of religion, "but never
condenms or rejects religion as a way of life, as
deification of life, or as expression of thankfulness.
The existence and the conception of God. Fietzsche
has often "been accused of iDeing a humanistic atheist.
Apart from the fact that he considered the vrorship of
1?human beings as detrimental to culture, there are
many other expressions in his v/ritings which force us
to surrender this accusation.
TTietzsche spoke of himself as the last follower
of the god Dionysos who wants to make man stronger,
more evil, deeper, and more "beautiful. "Ich, der
letzte Jflnger und Eingeweihte des Gottes Dionj'-sos. "^'^
This god Dionysos, the world, or the will to power-^^









ITietzsche has nothing but contempt for the
Christian conception of God and hopes that some
the v'orld might get rid of it.
Das griJsste neuere Ereignis dass
Gott tot ist", dass der Glauhe an den
Christ lichen Gott unglauhv.nilrdig geworden
ist heginnt "bereits seine ersten
Schatten tlber Suropa zu werfen.l6
This Cliristian god or the god of the priests is
detrimental to life, so TTietzsche holds, because
he is a symbol of everything vreak and v/eary of
Der Begriff Gott" stellt eine Abkehr
vom Leben, eine Kritik, eine Verachtung
selbst des Lebens dar.i7
Ihr sollt den dionysischen Festzug
von Indien nach Griechenland geleiteni
Rtlstet euch zu hartem Streite, aber
glaubt an die Wunder eures GottesllS
Ein stolzes Volk braucht einen Gott,
um zu opfern..,Man ist fi9r sich selber
dankbar: dazu braucht man einen Gott.
--Ein solcher Gott muss nilltzen und
schaden kflnnen, muss Freund und Feind
sein kflnnen.lS
Der delphische Gott ruft euch, gleich
am Anfange eurer Tanderung nach jenem
Ziele, seinen Spruch entgegen ,,Sr?K:enne
dich selbst". Es ist ein sch^iverer Spruch:
denn jener Gott „ verbirgt nicht und
verk^tndet nicht, sondern zeigt nur hin",













This last quotation gives us a hint as to 'vhat
Nietzsche means "by God. It is the philosophy of
Heraclitus that had influenced him, God is hecoming
or the universe in the course of its evolution.
"Die Welt besteht, , , sie hat nie angefangen zu
werden und nie aufgehflrt zu vergehen . "^-^ From the
fact that our life and experience are completely
involved in a process of "becoming we might draw a
conclusion concerning the nature of God.
Von beiden Seiten ist s.her die Mdglich-
keit ttToersehen, dass jenes GemSllde--das,
Fas jetzt uns llenschen Leben und Erfahrung
heisst— allra^lhlich gev/orden ist, ja noch
viJllig im '7erden ist und deshalb nicht
als feste GriJsse betrachtet v^erden soil,
von v:elcher aus man einen Schluss iDlber
den TTrheber (den zureichenden Grund)
machen oder auch nur ablehnen di^rfte.^
That conclusion is plain: God or the world has to
remain v/ithin the game of the universe. He or it
is limited in power and possibility.
So folgt daraus, dass sie eine berechen-
bare Zahl von Kombinatlonen im grossen
WiUrfelspiel ihres Daseins durchzumachen
hat . 23
Ein Gott, der allwissend und allmSlchtig
ist und der nicht einmal daftlr sorgt,






verstanden vrird , sollt e das ein Gott der
ante sein?24
God is not only "becoming and limited in his power,
he is actually suffering.
Gottes Weh ist tiefer, du wunderliche
^eltl Greife nach Gottes "7eh nicht nach
rair! "nTas bin ichl Eine trunkene stlsse
Leier.25
Nietzsche recognized the fact of evil and of
waste in the world. Concerning the heat of the sun
he wrote that "die tlbergrosse Masse ist verschwendet
ein kaum in Rechnung kommender Teil hat ,, Zweck".*^
Yet the economy of the whole justifies the existence
of evil.'^''' The dionysic God and man are ahle to face
misery "because they possess a surplus of crea^tive
power "by means of which they are ahle to turn each
desert into fertile land.
Der Reichste an Lehensf^llle, der dionysische
Gott und llensch, kann sich nicht nur den
Anhlick des FiHrchterlichen und FragwTilrdigen
gflnnen, sondem sellDst die fiilrchterliche Tat
und jeden Luxus von ZerstOrung, Zersetzung,
Verneinung; bei ihra scheint das BiJse, Unsin-
nige und H8,ssliche gleichsam erlaubt, infolge
eines Ueberschusses von zeugenden, befruch-
tenden Kr^ften, welcher aus jeder VMste noch














Although ITietzsche speaks of God or the Vv'orld
as a wonderful, healthjr, and very old power which lies
under this restless up and down of our cultural life,
can v/e call him a pantheist?
Alle unsere Hoffnungen strecken sich viel-
mehr sehnsuchtsvoll nach jener Wahrnehmung
aus, dass unter diesem unruhig auf und nieder
zuckenden Kulturlehen und Bildungskrarapf
e
eine herrliche, innerlich gesunde, uralte
Kraft verhorgen liegt, die freilich nur in
ungeheuren Moraenten sich gewaltig einmal
"bev/egt und dann wieder einem zukflnftigen
Erwachen entgegentrM,urat . 29
In this passage llietzsche does not identify God with
the cultural life and in his theory of art he regrets
the fa.ct that we cannot "become one with the original
artist of the world,
Somit ist unser ganzes Kunstwissen im
Grunde ein vdJllig illusori sches, weil wir
das Wis send e mit jenem We sen nicht eins
und identisch sind, das sich, als einziger
Schflpfer und Zuschauer Jener Kunstkomddie,
einen ewigen Genuss hereitet, TTur- soweit
der Genius im Aktus der kflnstleri schen
Zeugung mit jenera Urkflnstler der V/elt ver-
schrailzt, weiss er etwas SLter das ewige
We sen der Kunst,30
The ideal and the degenerate church. Religion






God a living reality, the preachers killed him.
Thus the churches have loecorne torahstones of God.
Was sirid denn diese Kirchen noch, wenn
sie nicht GrUfte und Grabm^ler Gottes
sind?31
There is no douht that historical Christianity
frequently counteracted nature's effort to preserve
anc to improve the race. Its conception of God v;as
sometimes an obvious contradiction to life. 7e can
hardly hlarae Nietzsche for using rather strong
language in expressing his r'isgust e.t this point.
Der christliche Gott es"begriff--Gott als
Krankengott, Gott als Spinne, Gott als
Geist--ist einer der korruptesten Gottes-
hegriffe, die auf Erden erreicht worden
sinc^..,Gott zura '7iderspruch des Lebens
abgeartet . 32
Nietzsche is sure that even Jesus, the founder of
the Christian church, would not have agreed to such
corruption in doctrine and spirit.
Die Kirche ist exakt das, wogegen Jesus
gepredigt hat--und v;ogegen er seine JiJlnger
ktopfen lehrte.33
Die Kirche gehdJrt so gut zum Triumph des
Antichristlichen, wie der moderne Staat, der
modeme Fationalismus. , .Die Kirche ist die







In these passages it should l^e noted that ITietzsche
did not attack Christianity itself, tut the church. He
despised degeneration and demanded strength. It is for
this reason that Nietzsche did not reject the church as
an institution. In its ideal form the church is even a
nohler institution than the state hecause it secures
the highest place for the notlest men*
Eine Kirche ist vor allem ein Herrschafts-
Geljilde, das den geistigeren Kenschen den
ohersten Rang sichert und an die I.acht der
Geistigkeit soweit glauht, um sich alle
grflheren Gev/altmittel zu verbieten, --damit
allein ist die Kirche unter alien FmstSlnden
eine vornehmere Institution al s der 3taat.35
Die maichtige Sch^nheit und Feinheit der
KirchenfiSrsten hat immerdar fi3r das Volk
die ¥ahrhei
t
der Kirche hevdesen; eine
zeitweilige Brutali sierung der Geistlichkeit
(v/ie zu Zeiten Luthers) ftthrte imraer den
Glauhen an das Gegenteil rait sich. 36
7/hat then does JTietzsche mean h:,^ degeneration in the
church and why does he attack it?
Sin and the need of redemption. TTietzsche
wages a hitter \var against the Christian conceptions
of sin, guilt, and redemption. He claims that the






was the v;ork of the priests to call man's healthiest
instincts sinful and to scorn the life of the loody
in order to secure authority and power over the
affa.irs of men.
Die SiHnde. , . ist erfunden, um 7/issenschaft,
urn Kultur, urn Jede ErhiJhung und Vornelimheit
des Menschen unmiJ^lich zu raachen; der Priester
herrscht durch die Erfindung der Stlnde.38
Jesus had abolished the whole concept of guilt and
denied that there occurred a separation "between God
and man "because of it. He lived in union with God
and proclaimed it as his Gospel.
Jesus hatte ja den Begriff „ Schuld"
selTost a"bgeschafft , --er hatte jede
Kluft zwischen Gott und Mensch geleugnet,
er lebte diese Sinheit von Gott und
Uensch als seine frohe Bot schaft " . 39
The Christians did the worst when they forsook the
teachings of Jesus and put guilt, submission,
resignation, fear and obedience in the place of
blooming and blossoming life. Thus they ruined the
reason even of the strongest intellectual persons.
Das Christentum. , .hat die Vernunft selbst
der geistig stS,rksten ITaturen verdorben,
indem es die obersten 7erte der Geistigkeit











There is no need of redemption from our instincts,
iDut there is need of control. "Sumraa: die Herrschaft
tllDer die Leidenschaften, nicht deren SchrSchung Oder
AusrottungI
Jesus and Christianity. Although Nietzsche is
known as one of the greatest opponents of Christianity
4? • . •his respect for Jesus is remarkahle. In his opinion
Jesus does not care for ritualism and the whole cult
of atonement and reconciliation. "5r ist rein
innerlich, "^"^ Jesus represents real life. The doctrine
of an eternal Peter and of an eternal succession of
apostolic authority are far from his conception of
life.
Jesus stellte ein wirkliches Lehen, ein
Lehen in der Tahrheit jenem giSttlichen
Leten gegem!!l"ber : nichts liegt ihm ferner,
als der plumpe ITnsinn eines verewigten
Petrus", einer ev/igen Personalfortdauer . 44
Therefore v^e should always distinguish "between
historical Christianity and its root. Soon after
Jesus* death the T^hole Christian movement was








Man soil das Christ entum als hi stori sche
Realitat nicht rait jener einen \7urzel ver-
wechseln, an welche es mit seinem ITaraen
erinnert .45
Die EvBngelien sind unschfttzhar als
Zeugnis ftlr die "bereits une-ufhalt sa-me
Korruption innerhalh der erst en Geineinde.
'J7as Pa.ulus spS.ter rait 6 em Logiker-Zyni sraus
eines Rahhiners zu Snde fiSlhrte, v;ar trotz-
dem hloss der Verfall-Frozess, der mit
dem Tode de"B Erlflsers "begann.46
Der ff frohen Eotschaft" folgte auf dem
Fuss die allerschliramst es die des Paulus.'^'^
Jesus had already made the mistake of thinking too
much of death, of taking sides with the spiritually
poor,^^and of stressing humhle virtues^^which can
50
neither win the world nor keep it. This tendency
iDecame even stronger in Paul whose teachings are
51the direct counterpart of the gospel of Nietzsche.
Paul promised divine favor to the weak, the foolish,
and the despised. >Tietzsche' s religion required
strength and moral excellence.
Fochmals erinnere ich a.n das unschfttzbare
Wort des Paulus: ,,\7as schwach ist vor der
Welt, was tflricht ist vor der Welt, das
Unedle und Verachtete vor der Welt hat
Gott erv'Ahlet"; das war die Formel, in hoc
signo siegte die d^adence.52
m,I,v,2o5; FY, V, 353.
'WzM,163.
Digges La Touche, PGIT, 135-136.







Christianity as a response to the urgent needs of the
masses is to "be rejected. It is robbing mankind of
those passions and intentions v/hich enrich, ennoble,
and beautify life. Historical Christianity, especially
54that of Paul, tries to break man completely and then,
by giving him a sudden gleam of divine mercy, takes
him by surprise,
La-s Christ en turn dagegen zerdrflckte und zer-
brach. den llenschen vollst^ndig und versenkte
ihn vfie in tiefen Schlamm: in das GefTShl
v(!)lliger Verworfenheit liess es dann rait
Sinem l£ale den Glanz eines giJttlichen 3rbarmens
hineinleuchten, so dass der Ueberraschte, durch
Gnade 3etS,ubte einen Schrei des SntzT!lckens aus-
stiess und fflr einen Augenblick den ganzen
Himrael in sich zu tragen glaubte,55
On the other hand, original Christianity will alv/ays
be respected, ITietzsche never intended to destroy
Christianity. Fe vanted to replace its ideals of
weakness by ideals of strength.
Ich habe dem bleichsiilchtigen Ghri stenideale
den ICrleg erklftrt ( samt dem, was ihm nahe
verwandt ist), nlcht in der Absicht es zu
vemichten, sondern nur, urn seiner Tyrannei
ein Snde zu setzen und den Platz freizube-
koramen filtr neue Ideale, ftlr robustere Ideale.^"
Yet, no matter how accurate the critical accusations






aga.inst Christianity may "be and how logical the con-
clusions of its opponents, it vrill survive as a ivorkable
code of morals, as a ^vay of life, not as a doctrine,
but as action.
Das Ghristentum ist jeden Augenblick noch
radJglich. Es ist an keines der unverschtoten
Dogmen gebunden, v/elche sich mit seinem
Namen geschmtlckt ha"ben: es braucht weder die
Lehre vom persflnlichen Gott, noch von der
Sttnde, noch von der Unsterblichkeit , noch
von der Erldsung, noch vom Glauhen; es hat
schlechterdings keine Metaphysik nfltig, noch
weniger den Asketisraus, noch weniger eine
christliche ,, Ksturwi ssenschaf t". . . Da.s
Ghristentum ist eine Praxis, keine Glaubens-
lehre. 3s sagt uns, wie wir handeln, nicht,
ras wir glauben sollen.^'7
Das ursprflngliche Ghristentum wird zu
alien Zeiten mflglich sein.,,Ficht ein
Glauhe, sondern ein Tun, ein Vieles-nicht-
tun vor allem, ein andres Sein.58
^2wzM,178.

3. THE RESULT OP THE HJVESTIGATIOK
Kant
1. Heligion is both
reason and action.
2. The ultimate goal
of religion is rational
faith in its purity,
3. V/as unahle to
recognize a distinctive
religious experience,
4. God is the world
architect, "but not the
almighty creator. He is
limited hy the fitness
of the material.
5. The ideal church is
an ethical community of
men who have entirely
adopted the v;ill of Cto6
as their own.
6. The natural propen-
sities of man are good in
themselves. They ought to
be controlled by reason.
7, In the moral act the
will of God and the will
of man coincide.
8. God is apart from the
world, but exists in it by
virtue of his power.
Nietzsche
1. Religion is a way
of life.
2. The purpose of religion
is to overcome inertia and
lack of vitality.
3. Affirmed the fact of
divine inspiration.
4, The god Dionysos, the
will to power, or the world
is limited, contains waste
and suffering. God is the
original artist of the world.
5, The ideal church is a
nobler institution than
the state because it
secures the highest place
for the noblest men.
6, To call instinctive
desires sinful is a
Jewish invention. There
is no need of redemption
from our instincts, but
there is need of control.
7, YJe are not God, although
we can become one v.'ith his
purpose.




9. Ijoctrines and creeds
prepare the way for the pure
religion of reason.
9. Jesus did not care
for ritualism and the
whole cult of atonement
and reconciliation.
Christianity is not a
doctrine, "but action or
a workalDle code of morals.
1©. Evil is only a tendency
tows.rd impurity of disposi
tion. l^-atural evils are
di sciplinary.
10. The economy of the






teachings of Jesus and
reports about Jesus.
11, v/as not so much
opposed to the teachings
of Jesus as to historical
Christianity.
Kant held that everything in the world points to
a v^orld architect, but not to a. creator. The truth
of an^r religious life is to be measured by its
harmony with the mora.l law. Jesus may be called
the Son of God, because his life was an expression
of the divine will. The greatest handicap to
religious progress is the radical evil in us which
is not a natural endowment, but a free act that
corrupts the source of all principles.
JTietzsche is convinced that belief in God is
essential to the health of a nation. God may be
either the v:ill to power, or the original artist of the
r
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world, or the universe in the course of its evolution.
Religion is a way of life. Sin is a Jewish invention.
The economy of the v^-hole justifies the existence of
evil. It is the sign of all great religions to over-
come epidemics of inertia and lack of vitality.
Vhile Kant is completely unatle to cope with the
proDlem of evil, Nietzsche takes it as a challenge.
Starting with the unity of the person, TTietzsche*s
evaluation of religion is more empirical than Kant's,
Hov/ever, he fails to realize the need for redemption.
Ke tends to overemphasize man's independence, vhereas
Kant stresses the importance of God*s aid heyond the
limits of man's povfer.
(
CHAPTER VI
THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS 05' ICANT NIETZSCHE
The purpose of this chapter is to determine what
Kant and Nietzsche meant by metaphysics, to set forth
their contributions, a.nd then to decide Vv-ho succeeded
in giving us the more coherent and rational interpretation
of the unified and total meaning of the facts as we knov
them, for that is the particular task of metaphysics.
1. THE i^TAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS 0¥ KANT
The meaning of metaphysics. Andre''Lalande in his
Vocabulaire de la Philosophie states four different
senses in which Kant used the terra metaphysics. First,
he applied it to the constructive part of philosophj'' as
over against the Critique and including all knovv'ledge
coming from pure reason. Second, the terra metaphysics
covers the whole field of pure reason including the
Critique. Third, metaphysics is the theory of the
objects of rational faith. Finally, Kant called the
regulative principles of scientific thought principles
of metaphysical wisdom. This last meaning can be
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omitted in the discussion TDecause the regulative principles
of science are included in the Critique.
1® II 1» applique ^ la partie constructive
de la philosophie oppos^e \ la Critique, et
«coniprenant toute la connaissance, vraie
ou apparent e, qui vient de la Raison pure»
2* ^ «tout I'ensemhle de la philosophie pure,
y compris la Critique;^; 3® ^ la th^orie des
ohjects de foi rationnelle; 4** enfin il
appelle «;principes de la sagesse metaphysique;^
les principes re'f2:ulateurs de la pensee
scientif ique, tels que TTatura non facit
saltus, etc. Mais cet usajre est s^condaire,
et le premier de ces quatres sens reste le
plus import ant.
1
Consequently this part of the chapter on the metaphysical
principles of Kant will "be divided into three sections:
the constructive part of philosophjr, the critical part
of philosophy, and the theory of the objects of rational
faith.
The constructive part of philosophy. Before he
wrote the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant was a follo^ver
of the Leihnizo-Wolffian school which insisted on the
a priori validity of reason. ^Tecessary truths can "be
obtained from the principles implanted in the mind
independently of any previous critique of the rational




and understanding consists merely in the relative
clearness of the knowledge which is given hy them.
According to Leihniz sensation is merely a confused
representation of things. From Descartes to Baumgarten
it was "believed that the understanding knows the things
as they are, sensihility merely as they appear. On
this principle rests the division of things into
phenomena and noumena. The understanding knows
noumena, whereas sensibility can only know phenomena.
Rationalism "built up a world of ideas which is
independent of experience. It claimed to obtain the
greatest possi"ble certainty in metaphysics "by analyzing
experience, explaining the phenomena "by the rules v/hich
such analysis discovers, and "by employing, as far as
possi"ble, the aid of mathematics. While under the sway
of Wolffian rationalism Kant attempted to establish a
2
rationalism of pure experience. If one's premises were
right then every part would fall into its place.
Die Metaphysik zeichnet sich unter alien
Wissenschaften dadurch ganz besonders aus,
dass sie die einzige ist, die ganz voll-




die TTachkommenschaft nichts fllDrig "bleibt hin-
zuzu setzen. 3
Sowie die Metaphysik als reine Philosophie
ihre Erkenntnis zuo"berst auf Denkforraen
gnSndet, unter welche nachher jedes Objekt
(Materie der Erkenntnis) su"bsumiert werden
raag.4
Sie ist die Ti ssenschaft , von der Erkenntnis
des Sinnlichen zu der des UelDersinnlichen
durch die Vernunft fort zuschreiten.
5
Rational metaphjrsics consisted merely in the development
of first principles "by means of logical anal^^sis. It
did not aim at an increase in knowledge, "but was satis-
fied with clear and distinct conceptions. Its immediate
task vras to deal with "the first things" hut its ultimate
aim was "the last things" of the intelligihle vorld.
Conceptions vrere anal^rzed and knowledge was made to
conform to objects. The test of truth was reason, hut
the method "by which to arrive at it was the analytical
method of Hewton.
Der letzte Probierstein der Wahrheit ist
immer die Vernunft.
7
Die echte Methode der Metaphysik ist mit
derjenigen im Grunde einerlei, die ITewton





^Ll'i, 11,156; cf. LOG, 56.
8115,1,129-130; cf. 133, 118, PRO, 275.
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Dogmatic rationalism believes that it has discovered
an infallible criterion in the clearness of ideas and a
sure method in mathematics. Kant realized the inadequacy
of this procedure in 1769, after Hume's scepticism had
stimulated him to investigate our right to have absolute
confidence in the a priori validity of reason. If the
clearness of ideas be our criterion then Spinoza has as
much right to claim the truth for his pantheistic system
as Leibniz for his individualism. Mathematics also does
not owe its unquestioned acceptance to the clearness of
its concepts, but to the fact that these can be constructed
in experience. Rationalism failed to see the intuitive
element in mathematics and overlooked its synthetic
character. Progress in mathematics does not depend on
conceptual analysis, but on the presentation of its
objects in experience.
If, however, knowledge is merely a product of
sensation, as the empiricists maintain, then there cannot
be a metaphysics nor can there be a science of the objects
of experience. Sensations can give us information
concerning single facts, but can never yield necessity
or universality. Experience tells us what is, but not
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that it must necessarily "be so. Empiricism alone will
inevitably lead to scepticism, Hume, for instance,
claimed that all phenomena of experience are separate
existences. There is no evidence of a necessary
connection "between them. The idea of necessary connection
is one which our mind, long immersed in custom, has
projected upon experience without any oTojective warrant,
Kant realized that the idea of necessarj'- connection does
not rest upon the scope of our experience; for experience
always falls short of the universal.
The problem is to determine in how far empiricism
and rationalism can he accepted. The exponents of
rationalism are right in maintaining that some ideas
do not come from the senses, hut from reason. There
are certain judgments which the very nature of thought
constrains us to form and which force upon us the idea
of a necessary connection among the various events of
our experience, whatever these events in particular may
he. If knowledge is to he possible some concepts cannot
come from sensation because sense perception is lacking
in necessity and universality. On the other hand,
empiricists are right in asserting that only an
experienced object can be known. If we combine rationalism
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and empiricism we could claim of a concept that it
originated in reason, but is valid only for objects
of experience.
In the critical part of his philosophy Kant tries
to establish the exact scope and function of the two
sources of knowledge: reason and experience* and to
explain how theie can be a priori knowledge of sensible
objects. At the same time he prepares the way for the
9
objects of rational faith. Reason drives the mind from
the mere datum to the conception of a v/hole mind and a
v/hole world. Metaphysics is the occupation of reason
vdth it self.
The critical part of philosophy. Kant sets out
with a twofold division of judgments. A priori judgments
give us a clearer view of what we already know. They are
characterized by necessity and strict universality because
they do not depend on the experience of individual
things. Consequently a priori judgments presuppose a
faculty of knov/ledge capable of yielding knowledge
^Tatson, PKE,43.
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without appeal to experience. Kant holds that reason is
that faculty. Synthetic judgments are not confined to
analysis of concepts, hut extend our knowledge hy
recognizing a predicate which is not contained in the
conception of the suhject. The prohlem which Kant
attempts to solve is therefore, 'Are synthetic judgments
a priori possihle'? Any field of knowledge vrhich can
claim synthetic judgments a priori is a science.
Kant helieves himself ahle to point out two kinds
of synthetic judgments a priori as actually existing:
mathematical propositions and certain principles which
12
underlie physics. Mathematics and physics contain
undisputed examples of universal and necessary knowledge.
The affirmations of metaphysics, however, are disputed,
hut in their tendency they are also synthetic judgments
a priori. It is Kant's purpose to investigate whether
synthetic judgments a priori are possible in metaphysics.
With this purpose in view Kant discovered a
permanent and an accidental element in our experience.




possible that the mind can in a certain way be affected
"by the presence of an object. Kant called the brute facts,
which are thus received, the accidental element, whereas
space, the form of the outer sense, and time, the form of
the inner sense, are permanent forms and as such antecedent
to all perceptions of external objects. ^Jlhile sensibility
is the mark of the receptivity of the mind, spontaneity is
13
that of the understanding. The understanding creates
its objects and the world. "Der Verstand ist SchiJpfer
seiner GegenstAnde und der Welt."^^ World or nature is
then a combination of appearances according to rules.
Die ganze TTatur flberhaupt ist eigentlich
nichts anderes, als ein Zusajnmenhang von
Erscheinungen nach Regeln; und es gibt T9ber-
all keine Regellosigkeit . 15
Thus the understanding is the faculty of subsuming under
rules and of determining the particular by means of the
universal. It introduces law and connection among the
individual sensations. Without it there would be chaos.
Yet the understanding alone can perceive nothing
and the senses can think nothing. All perceptions depend






'log, 12; cf. KrV, Beilage, A, 125.
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which arrange different representations under one coraraon
representation. Knowledge is therefore the combined
product of sensibility and understanding.
Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen,
und die Sinne nichts zu denken. Uvlt daraus,
dass sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntnis
ent springen .16
Every datum of experience is a synthesis of elements.
Experience is not an aggregate of isolated "bits. The
mind's activity of synthesizing and unifying experience
expresses itself in judgments about sense data. The
forms of these judgments are called categories.
The validity of the categories consists in the
fact that it is only through them that any object of
experience can be thought. We may assert quantity,
quality, relation, and modality of everything that
occurs in our experience,
Folglich steht alle Synthesis, -wodurch
selbst V/ahrnehmung mflglich wird, unter den
Kategorien, und da Erfahrung Erkenntnis
durch verknflpfte T/ahmehraungen ist, so
sind die Kategorien Bedingungen der Mflg-
lichkeit der Erfahrung und gelten also a






The categories are therefore conditions 7/ithout which
experience would not be possihle. How is such an
application of the categories to the manifold of impres-
sions possible? The schema affords a meeting ground for
the categories and the sensible manifold, because it is
conceptual and sensible at the same time.
The schema is produced by the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination. Consequently all schemata
ha.ve to do v:ith the nature of the inner sense: time.
Time is as a form a priori homogeneous with the
categories, and as a form of the sensibility, vath
phenomena. Therefore an application of the categories
to phenomena is possible through the transcendental
functions of time. The schemata, in the order of the
categories (quantity, quality, relation, modality),
are founded on the serial nature of time, the contents
of time, the order of time, and on time as a whole.
Die Schemata sind daher nichts als Zeit-
bestimraungen a priori nach Regeln, und diese
gehen nach der Ordnung der Kategorien auf
die Zeitreihe, den Zeitinhalt, die Zeitordnung,
endlich den Zeit inbegriff in Ansehung aller
mdglichen Gegen stand e, 18
KrV,184.
I
Inasmuch as the understanding with its immanent
laws or categories supervenes on the chaos of sensa-
tions, it creates the ^r.-orld of phenomenal experience.
Hence all unity in the empirical world proceeds from
the transcendental unity of apperception. This is a
unifj'-ing principle vhich "binds our consciousness
together so that we always recognize our experience
as one and the same.
Die Einheit der Apperception aber ist der
transcendentale Grund der notwendigen Gesetz-
mSlssigkeit aller Erscheinungen in einer
Erfahmng. Eben dieselbe Einheit der Apper-
ception in Ansehung eines Mannigfaltigen von
Vorst ellungen (es nftmlich aus einer einzigen
zu bestimmen) ist die Kegel und das Vermflgen
dieser Regeln der Verstand.l9
Kow then is a priori knowledge of sensible
objects possible? Kant replies that man brought to
the material which he acquired empirically by means
of his receptivity certain pure forms or categories
according to which he perceived all given material.
The mind has itself determined the nature of the
cases. Physical experiments are fruitful only 7/hen




rrom the knowledge of the sensuous metaphysics advances
"by means of reason to the supersensuous , to God, freedom,
and immortality.
Gott, Freiheit und Unst erhlichkeit sind
diejenigen Aufgaben, zu deren AufldJsung
alle Zurtistungen der Metaphysik, als ihrem
letzten und alleinigen Zwecke, abzielen.^O
The theory of the objects of rational faith. Kant
tried to maintain that the categories are relative to
ourselves and do not apply to things in themselves.
Daher haben auch die reinen Verstandes-
begriffe ganz und gar keine Bedeutung,
wenn sie von Gegen stand en der Erfahrung
abgehen und auf Dinge an sich selbst
(Noumena) bezogen werden wollen.21
If this doctrine were true it would follow that reality
can neither be real nor unreal, neither substance nor
attribute, neither one nor many, neither cause nor effect,
for all these are categories. Universal judgments a priori
are therefore limited to objects as mere appearances and
cannot be extended to things in themselves,
¥enn wir synthetische TJrteile a priori fallen
kiJnnen, dieses nur von GegenstAnden der Anschau-
ung als blossen Erscheinungen a,ngehe.22
TTebersinnliche Gegenst^nde sind fiSr uns keine
Gegenstftnde unseres theoreti schen Erkenntnisses?^
107,465.
;PR0,312.
•In a letter to Kerz, May 26, 1789.




Yet man is not merely intellect; he is also will. Even
if we cannot demonstrate God, freedom, and immortality
with the precision of a science they must necessarily be
postulated because without them the mind would lose itself
in inner contradiction. Although we cannot know reality
by sense perception, we can think it,
Es ISlsst sich manches Uebersinnliche denken.*^^
Da wir nun aber diese Verstandeswesen nach
dem, was sie an sich selbst sein miJgen, d.i.
bestimmt, nieraals erkennen kiJnnen, gleichv/ohl
aber solche im Verh^.ltnis auf die Sinnenv/elt
dennoch annehmen und durch die Vernunft damit
verkn^lpfen mttssen, so werden wir doch wenigstens
diese Verknflpfung verraittelst solcher Begriffe
denken kflnnen, die ihr VerhSlltnis zur Sinnen-
welt ausdn9cken.25
As a theoretical faculty reason cannot be used in
the world of the senses. It belongs as a practical
faculty to the v/orld of the free will which is the realm
of thought or of noumena.
Also kann die Vernunft, s.ls theoreti sches
spekulatives Vermflgen, hier in dieser Sinnen-
welt gar nicht gebraucht Vvrerden (und muss
folglich, weil sie doch einmal als solches
da ist, fiSr eine and ere V/elt bestimmt sein),
sondem nur als prakti sches Vermflgen, zum





Although Kant removed sensuous knowledge in order to make
room for faith, it would he wrong to say that he returned
27
to chaos in order to find freedom. Reason is the faculty
which hy its principles estahlishes unity among the rules
of the understanding. It regulates the employment of the
understanding and has nothing to do with chaos. Without
the objects of rational faith, which are ideas of reason,
there would he chaos and the mind would lose itself in
inner contradiction.
Der Verstand mag ein VermiJgen der Einheit
der Erscheinungen vermittelst der Regeln sein,
so ist die Vemunft das Vermflgen der Einheit
der Verstandesregeln unter Prinzipien.28
Kant called this realm of freedom also the realm of
noumena. What does he mean hy noumena? While Kant
defined a phenomenon as a representation of a thing which
is unknown to us in its intrinsic nature or as "der
sinnliche Begriff eines Gegenstandes, in Uehereinstimmung
mit der Kategorie**, he meant by noumenon the thing
in itself.
Der Begriff eines Noumenon d.i., eines Dinges,
welches gar nicht als Gegenstand der Sinne,
sondern als ein Ding an sich selbst (lediglich
durch einen reinen Verstsmd) gedacht werden






kann von der Sinnlichkeit doch nicht "behaupten,
dass sie die einzige miJgliche Art der Anschauung
sei.30
Just as Kant distinguished iDetv/een phenomena and
nouraena, so did he separate man as a phenomenon from
man as a causa noumenon. ITature and the empirical man
are su"bject to necessity, whereas man as a noumenon or
intelligent heing is alDSolutely free, Ivfy self-consciousness
contains therefore a douhle ego: the ego as sulDject and
the ego as object,
llun ist der Begriff eines 7/esens, das freien
Willen hat, der Begriff einer causa noumenon. ^1
Ich hin mir meiner selhst hev/usst, ist ein
Gedanke, der schon ein zweifaches Ich enth9,lt,
das Ich als Subject und das Ich ale Ohjekt.
Wie es m^Jglich sei, dass ich, der ich denke,
mir selber ein Gegenstand (der Anschauung)
sein und so mich von mir selbst unterscheiden
kflnne, ist schlechterdings unmflglich zu
erklSlren, obwohl es ein unhezweifeltes Faktura
ist .32
Allein der Mensch, der die ganze ITatur sonst
lediglich nur durch Sinne kennt, erkennt sich
selhst auch durch hlosse Apperception, und
zwar in Kandlungen und inneren Bestimmungen
,
die er gar nicht zum Eindrucke der Sinne z^hlen
kann, und ist sich selhst freilich eines Teils
Phftnomen, anderen Teils aber, ntolich in
Ansehung gewisser YermiJgen, ein bloss
intelligibler Gegenstand, weil die Kandlung
desselben gar nicht zur Receptivit^t der Sinn-








If self-consciousnesB is a process vjhich includes
all the categories and "brings them "back to the unity
involved in them, then Kant's assertion that from the
analytic judgment all the categories may "be derived
points to a truth. Self-consciousness in its unity in
difference contains all the keys "by v/hich we are to
unlock the secrets of the v/orld.'^^ Yet in Kant's
philosophy this unity of self-consciousness cannot
assure us that the soul itself is simple and rea.l.
So viel ist gewiss, dass ich rair durch das
Ich jederzeit eine a"bsolute, aher logische
Einheit des Suhjects ( Einfachheit denke),
a"ber nicht, dass ich dadurch die wirkliche
Einfachheit meines Su"bjects erkenne,35
Kant adhered to the old soul- substance theory which
claims that there is a permanent immaterial reality
underlying consciousness.
Dieses denkende Sel"bst (die Seele) mag
nun a"ber auch als das letzte Suhjekt des
Denkens, was sel"bst nicht weiter als Prtdikat
eines anderen Dinges vorgestellt werden kann,
Su"bstanz heissen: so blei"bt dieser Begriff
doch gftnzlich leer und ohne alle Folgen,
vjenn nicht von ihm die Beharrlichkeit als
das, was den Begriff der Substanzen in der
Erfahrung fruchtbar macht, bewiesen werden
kann, 37






Denn in dem, was vrir Seele nennen, ist
alles im continuirlichen Flusse und nichts
BleilDendes, ausser etwa (wenn man es durch-
aus will) das darum so einfache Ich, weil
diese Vorstellung keinen Inhalt, mi thin
kein Mannigfaltiges hat, weswegen sie auch
scheint ein einfaches Ohject vorzustellen,
Oder besser gesagt, zu "bezeichnen.^S
It may "be that Kant expressed some doubt as to the
necessity of this simple ego when he added "wenn man
es durchaus will" (if one wants it by all means). 3y
accepting it, however, he abandoned his doctrine that
the categories can be applied only to phenomena because
he maintained that this simple ego or substance is one,
identical, and a cause. The unity of apperception could
have taken care of all his difficulties in this respect.
After reason explored itself it went on to explore
its world. In the phenomenal world Kant discovers la.w
and purpose, 'Ve are compelled by reason to view the
organic world as being the work of God.
Es ist ein Gott eben deswegen, weil die
TTatur auch selbst im Chaos nicht anders als
regelmSssig und ordentlich verfahren kann.39
The teleological interpretation of nature is an inevitable
attitude of reason, aroused by the contemplation of certain
phenomenal forms, but it has no legitimate use in experience




except as a working hypothesis or guiding principle.
Der unseren schwachen "^egriffen angemessene
Ausdruck v;ird sein: dass wir uns die Welt so
denken, a.ls oh sie von einer hiJchsten Vernunft
ihrem Dasein und inneren Bestimmung nach
ahstaiome. 41
The order and the design in the world presuppose an
architect of great v/isdom and power, hut not an almighty
creator; for to order and to create are two different
things. Kant did not share the hlind optimism of
Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds.
In opposition to Leibniz Kant concluded the existence
of God from the constitution of the world. Leibniz
presupposed the existence of God and justified the
presence of evil in the world. Kant accepted an
evolutionary optimism. The community sense which is
observed among all created things and the fact that
they possess the capacity of working toward a perfect
whole prove the wisdom of the highest being.
The physico-teleological proof for the existence
of God lead the mind by way of purposes to an intelligent
cause of the world, but it is the moral argument which
ascribes to the highest being a final purpose. The





upon us "by reason "bring out a definite concept of God.
''fie admit among our moral viev/s a cause harmonizing with
it. If we thus use the categories for a knowledge of God
not from theoretical, "but from practical consideration,
then the alleged contradiction that the categories can
onlj'' produce knowledge when applied to objects of sense,
hut in no way when applied to the supersensible, vanishes,
Auch wird die T^efremdung oder der vorgebliche
^iderspruch einer hier "behaupteten Mflglichkeit
einer Theologie mit dem, was die Kritik der
spekulativen Vemunft von den Kategorien sagte;
dass diese nSbnlich nur in Anwendung auf Gegen-
stSnde der Sinne, keineswegs aher auf das
T^ebersinnliche angewandt, Erkenntnis hervor-
hringen kflnnen, verschwinden , wenn man sie hier
zu einem Erkenntnis Gottes, aher nicht in
theoreti scher (nach dem, was seine uns uner-
forschliche TJatur an sich sei ) , sondern ledig-
lich in prakti scher Ahsicht gehra-ucht sieht.42
In the emploj'ment of the practical reason God is
the highest object of moral and religious faith without
whom there would be no immortality or conservation of
values. Reality is an order in conformity with ends,
a realization of moral ideas. As moral persons it is
our duty to cooperate with God in the attempt to
accomplish the highest good. The final purpose of man
is not enjoj'-ment, contemplation, or admiration. Reason
KIT, 479
I
requires a personal value. Man alone can give himself
a personal worth as the condition under which he and his
"being can he the final purpose. The highest pood is
therefore moral development to perfect happiness or the
harmony between merit and happiness.
Das moralische Gesetz gehietet, das hdJchste
m^gliche Gut in einer Y/elt mir zura letzten
Gegenstande alles Verhaltens zu raachen. Dieses
aher kann ich nicht zu hevdrken ho ffen, als
nur durch die Uehereinstimmung meines Willens
mit dem eines heiligen und giSltigen Welt-
urhehers.43
Zum Geniessen oder zum Anschauen, Betrachten
und Bewundem.,,, als dem letzten Endzweck,
warum die Welt und der Mensch selhst da ist,
geschaffen zu sein, kann die Vernunft nicht
hefriedigen; denn diese setzt einen persdJnlichen
Wert, den der Mensch sich allein gehen kann, als
Bedingung, unter welcher er und sein Dasein
Endzweck sein kann, voraus.44
The realization of the highest good in the world is
the necessary object of the v;ill which is determined hy the
moral law. In the moral will the complete conformity of
attitudes to the moral law is the essential condition for
realizing the highest good. Such conformity must be just
as possible as the realization of the highest good because
it is contained in the same command to advance this





to the moral law is sanctity, a perfection which no
rational "being of the '.vorld of the senses at an:^ time
of its existence can reach. Since sanctity is practically
necessary, however, it can l3e found only in a progress ad
infinitum. According to the principles of pure practical
reason we have to accept such an advancement as the real
ohject of our will. This infinite progress is however
possihle only under the presupposition of an eternally
lasting existence and personality of the same reasonable
iDeing, which we call the immortality of the soul,
Dieser unendliche Progressus ist a.'ber nur
unter Voraussetzung einer ins Unendliche
fortdauernden Existenz und Persflnlichlceit
desselhen vernflnftigen 'Vesens (welche man
die UnsterlDlichkeit der Seele nennt) miJglich.^^
KpV, 122.

2. THE METAPHYSICAL COITCEPTIONS OF ITIETZSCHS
The meaning of metaphysics. It is not enough to
say that ITietzsche was simply a sceptic"^ because he
actually attempted to attain to certainty and established
the metaphysical principle that reality is of the nature
of will. What he meant by metaphysics cannot be clearly
stated because he sometimes uses the term with contempt
and sometimes with the greatest respect. Whenever
metaphysics deals with the concept of substance, with
freedom of the will, with a God apart from the world
and his purpose, and with the distinction between a real
world and a phenomenal world, Uietzsche calls it the
science of the fundamental errors of man.
In sofern aber alle Metaphj'-sik sich vor-
nehmlich mit Substanz und Freiheit des Willens
abgegeben hat, so darf man sie als die Wissen-
schaft bezeichnen, welche von den Grundirr-
tfimern des Menschen handelt, doch so, als
v/a,ren es Grundwahrheiten,
2
The Hietzschean metaphysics presupposes that this world
is the real world.
Vor allem: wie kommen wir darauf , dass
nicht unsre V/elt die wahre ist?3
;Foster,FN,177; Ellis, art. 1.




Die „ wahre Welt" und die schein"bare
T7elt"— auf deutschs die erlogne Welt und
die Realitat.4
If this world is the real world, what is the specific
task of metaphysics? The physical sciences take care
of all the facts, but they do not justify the existence
of the v7orld. Since the world is justified only as an
aesthetic phenomenon, ;Mietzsche emphasizes the necessity
of a metaphysics of art,
Hier nun wird es nfltig, uns rait einera
kflhnen Anlauf in eine Metaphysik der Kunst
hineinzuschwingen, indem ich den frflheren
Satz wiederhole, dass nur als ein ftsthetisches
Phanomen das Dasein und die Welt gerecht-
fertigt erscheint.5
Metaph^rsics is a. supplement to the reality of nature.
ITietzsche recognized that life contains more than the
mechanism of nature. There are judgments of value,
the individual and its characteristics, and above all
the will to power. The specific task of jMietzsche*s
raetaphj'-sics is therefore to interpret our experience
so as to justify the existence of the world.
Judgments of value. Sense perceptions cannot be
separated from judgments of value. We prefer the




definite to the indefinite, truth to mere serahlance.
Es ist kein Zweifel, dass alle Sinnes-
wahrnehinungen g^nzlich durchsetzt sind
mit 'v7erturteilen.
6
Hinter aller Logik und ihrer anscheinenden
Selhstherrlichkeit der Bewegung stehen Wert-
schatzungen, deutlicher gesprochen, physio-
logische Forderungen zur Erhaltung einer
bestimmten Art von Leben. Zura Beispiel, dass
das Bestimmte mehr wert sei als das
UnTDestiramte, der Schein weniger wert als
die ,,'«Vahrheit".7
Yet whatever has value in the world does not have it
in itself. The world as such is nothing but a monster
of power without "beginning or end. It has no instincts,
no impulses, and not even laws. There are also no
oppo sites in nature. ¥arm and cold are merely
differences of degree.
Die ¥elt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne
Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste, eherne
GrdJsse von Kraft.
8
Es hat auch keinen Selhsterhaltungstrieh
und flherhaupt keine Triehe; es kennt auch
keine Gesetze,^
Die allgemeine ungenaue Beobachtung sieht
in der Katur tlberall Gegensatze (wie z.B.
„ warm und kalt") wo keine GegensSltze,
sondern nur Gradverschiedenheiten sind.-^^
Es gibt keine Gegensfttze: nur von denen
der Logik her haben wir den Begriff des









Contrasts have their origin in logic. Anything that
has value in the world owes it to man. Therefore man
is the creator of his o^n ?/orld..
Was nur Wert hat in der jetzigen Welt, das
hat ihn nicht an sich, seiner Natur nach--
die Uatur ist immer wertlos--: sondem dem
hat man einen Wert einmal gegeten, geschenkt,
und T^ir waren diese Geloenden und SchenkendenI
Wir erst hahen die Welt, die den Menschen
etwas angeht, geschaffen J 12
Wir aher wollen die werden, die wir sind...
und dazu railssen wir die hesten Lerner und
Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Fotwendigen
in der Welt werden. 13
Die neuen Werte mftssen erst geschaffen
werden— ...Der Philosoph muss uns ein
Gesetzgeher sein.l4
Die Werte fflr seine Handlungen entnimmt der
Einzelne zuletzt doch sich sellser: weil er
auch die flherlieferten Worte sich ganz
individuell deuten muss. Die Auslegung der
Pormel ist mindestens persiJnlich, wenn er
auch keine Formel schafft: als Ausleger ist
er immer noch schaffend.l5
The characteristics of the self. If values depend
on man, let us determine what man is. TTietzsche was no
optimist in his description of man in general. He called
mankind a hideous old woman and claimed that the earth






GaTD es je noch ein scheusslicheres altes
Weib unter alien alt en ^eiTDern?16
Im Menschen ist so viel 3ntsetzlichesl . .
.
Die Erde war zu lange echon ein Irrenhausl^?
What then does ITietzsche consider the essence
man? His conception of man is not at all organized
iDut at some time or another he claimed these
characteristics of man: First, the highest powers
man are reason, freedom, and science.
Das 'Yesentliche und Auszeichnende am
Menschen ist: Vernunft und ^i ssenschaf t
,
des Menschen allerhflchste Kraft. •18
ITichts ist teurer erkauft , . , als das
':7enige von menschlicher Vernunft und vom
Geftlhle der Freiheit, was jetzt unsern
Stolz ausmacht,19
Doch ist...nur der Grad der Vernunf t in
der Kraft entscheidend . 20
Die Verkennung von Leidenschaft und
Vernunft, wie als oh letztere ein Tesen
ftir sich sei und nicht vielmehr ein
Verhaitniszu stand verschiedener Leiden-
schaften und Begehrungen; und als ob
nicht jede Leidenschaft ihr C^uantum
Vernunft in sich hatte,21
Der Schmerz ist ein intellektueller
Vorgang, in dem entschieden ein TTrteil
laut wird,—das Urteil schftdlich", in







Second, Nietzsche cierived the concept of cause from
the su"bjective conviction that we ourselves are causes
and said that cause is "unser llachtgefflhl vom
sogenannten Wollen."^"^ Phenomena cannot he causes.
Only man can make a choice and carry out his decision.
His will is free to say yes or no.
'jyir hahen ahsolut keine Erfahrung fiber
eine Ursache; psychologi sch nachgerechnet
,
komrat uns der ganze Begriff aus der
suhjektiven Ueherzeugung, dass wir ITrsache
sind. 24
Erscheinungen kflnnen nicht » Ursachen"
seini 25
Ich verstehe unter Freiheit des Geistes "
etwas sehr Bestimmtes: . , ,nein zu sagen, wo
das Fein gefMhrlich ist.26
77er aher gehorcht, der hflrt sich selTDer
nichtI27
Third, that which hest differentiates man from the
animal is in ITietzsche's opinion his capacity for
making and keeping a promise. Man is ahle to save
impressions from the ohlivion of forgetfulness. He





'^'AsZjVon alt en und neuen Tafeln, 7.
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ETDendieses notv/endig vergessliche Tier,
an dem das Vergessen eine Kraft, eine Form
der starken Gesundheit darstellt, hat sich
nun ein Gegenverm(9gen angeztlchtet , ein
Ged^chtnis, mit Hilfe dessen f^lr gewisse
Faile die Vergesslichkeit ausgehftngt v/ird.^^
Dieser Freigewordne , der ii^irklich ver-
sprechen darf, dieser Herr des freien
Willens, dieser Souver^n—wie sollte er
es nicht rissen, welche Ue1:>erlegenlieit er
darait vor allem voraushat, was nicht ver-
sprechen und f<lr sich seli>st gutsagen
darf .29
Wie muss der Mensch, um dermassen "flber
die Zukunft vorauszuverfttgen, erst gelernt
hsben das notwendige vom zufftlligen
Geschehen scheiden, kausal denken, das
Feme wie gegenwtrtig sehn und vorwegnehraen,
was Zvreck ist, T^as Mittel dazu ist, mit
Sicherheit ansetzen, iSCberhaupt rechnen,
"berechnen ki)nnen«30
Fourth, every person enjoys privacy, ^i^e cannot know
the content of another person's mind, unless the
other person communicates his thoughts to us.
\7as hegreifen wir denn von unserm
!MM,chsten als seine Grenzen, ich meine
das, womit er sich auf und an uns gleich-
sam einzeichnet und eindrtlckt? Y/ir
"begreifen nichts von ihm als die
Vera,nderungen an uns, deren Ursache er







Keine Erfahrung zum Bei spiel nter einen
Menschen, sttlnde er uns auch noch so nah,
Icann vollstftndig sein, so dass v/ir ein
logisches Recht zu einer GesamtabschSltzung
desselten hfttten,32
Privacy alone, hov/ever, does not make us recognize our
identity. Our action and our knov^ledge is a continuous
stream.
In Wahrheit aber ist all unser Kandeln
und Erkennen keine Folge von Fakten und
leeren Zwi schenr^umen , sondern ein
"besttndiger Fluss.33
If we "believe that form is permanent apart from
the mind, then we are mistaken. Form is nothing but
a creation of mind. The fact that we al\7ays perceive
an object in the same form does not mean that it is
the same form. Our mind is continually creating a new
form of the perceived object and we -who compare it with
the old form recognize its identity. Thus the form of
an object always appears as something permanent.
Die Form gilt als etwas Dauerndes und
deshalb Wertvolleres; aber die Form ist
bloss von uns erfunden; und wenn noch so
oft „ dieselbe Form erreicht wird", so
bedeutet das nicht, dass es dieselbe Form
ist,— sondern es erscheint immer etwas





rechnen das Neue, insofern es Alt em gleicht,
zusammen in die Sinheit der „ Form". 34
The purpose of the categories. If this is the
real v/orld then the purpose of the categories is not
to lead us to reality, hut to help us control reality,
Das ist der grdJsste Irrtum,der begangen
worden ist, das eigentliche Verhftngnis des
Irrtums auf Erden: man glaubte ein Kriteriura
der Realitat in den Vernunftformen zu haben,
--w^hrend man sie hatte, um Herr zu werden
fiber die Realitllt.35
Die Kategorien sind ,, Y/ahrheiten" nur in
dem Sinne, als sie lebendbedingend ftir uns
sind. 36
All our knowledge is conditioned by our mind. If
our knowledge is thus conditioned, what is mind itself
without its content? This is an impossible question,
because how can anyone look into a mirror without
seeing himself in it? Our world is nothing but the
product of our mental activity. Consequently we find
in the things nothing else but what the mind has put
into them.
Wir kiJnnen nur eine YIelt begreifen, die
wir selber geraacht haben. 37
Der Mensch findet zuletzt in den Dingen
nichts wieder, als was er selbst in sie






Und v/as ihr Welt nanntet, das soli erst
von euch geschaffen werden: eure Vernunft,
euer Bild, euer Wille, eure Liebe soli es
sel"ber -orerdenl Und wahrlich zu eurer
Seligkeit, ihr Erkennendenl ^9
Der menschliche Intellekt hat die
Srscheinung erscheinen lassen und seine
irrttlmlichen Grundauffassungen in die
Dinge hineingetragen.^O
Wir sehen alle Dinge durch den Menschen-
kopf an und kOnnen die sen Kopf nicht a"b-
schneiden; wfthrend doch die Frage tllDrig-
bleilDt, was von der \7elt noch da w^re,
wenn man ihn doch abgeschni tten h§.tte.41
Etwas TTnbedingtes ka^nn nicht erkannt
werden: sonst wftre es eben nicht unhedingtl
Erkennen ist aher immer ft sich irgendwo in
Bedingung setzen", . . sich durch etwas
hedingt f*lhlen und ehenso es selbst
unsrerseits bedingen.42
Versuchen vrir den Spiegel an sich zu
"betrachten, so entdecken wir endlich
nichts als die Dinge auf ihm. ^^ollen wir
die Dinge fassen, so kommen wir zuletzt
wieder auf nichts als auf den Spiegel.
Dies ist die allgeraeinste Geschichte der
Erkenntnis.43
Wo der Mensch nichts raehr zu sehen und
zu greifen hat, da hat er auch nichts mehr
zu suchen.44
TTietzsche's metaph3''sics is therefore closely
related to Hegel who "believed that within the
ph^'-sical process the evolution of the idea takes
39






place. This world, is the real world, Ixit it is constantly
developing. Reality is the name for a process.
,,-yahrheit" ist sorait nicht etwas, das da
vj^re und das aufzufinden, zu entcecken ware,
— sondern etwas, das zu schaffen ist und das
den Uaraen Mr einen Prozess alDgiht.^S
Inzwischen wSchst und wftchst die organisierende,
die zur Herrschaft "berufne Idee" in der
Tiefe,— sie heginnt zu befehlen, sie leitet-
langsam aus Nebenwegen und Ahwegen zurt^ck, sie
"bereitet einzelne Qualitftten und Tflchtig-
keiten vor, die einmal als Mittel zum Ganzen
sich unenfbehrlich erweisen werden.46
There is hardly any douht that ITietzsche is strongly
influenced hy Hegel and hy Schopenhauer. He himself
makes mention of this fact when he says that the
principle of becoming and the question concerning the
value of existence are the greatest philosophical
views.
Die heiden gr(!Jssten (von Deutschen
gefundenen) philosophi schen Gesicht spunkte:
a) der des ^^erdens , der Entwicklung;
h) der nach dem Werte des Daseins [aJoer
die erb^rmliche Form des deutschen Pessimis-
mus erst zu ^Iberwinden! )—
beide von mir in ent scheidender Weise
zu samraengebracht . ^7






The result of this comhination is the metaphysics of
the will to power. This will to power is the fundamental
reality which is observed everywhere. It is a principle
of development vrhich denies pessimism hut demands
progress, control, and even eternal life.
The categories, which are principles of control,
are therefore principles that are true to reality,
Aller Sinn ist ^[1116 zur Macht (alle
Beziehungssinne lassen sich in ihm auf-
iasen).4S
The prohlem of substance. If this is the real
II I I r- - I
world and if the purpose of raetaphj^^sics is to justify
its existence then the term substance becomes useless.
There is no substratum of any kind behind the activity
which we observe. Reality is activity and as such a
multiplicity of processes, which are all expressions
of the will to power.
Der Begriff ,, Substanz" ist vollkommen
unbrauchbar, v/enn man erklSlren will. 49
Es gibt keine ewig dauerhaften Substanzen;
die Materie ist ein ebensolcher Irrtum wie










Aber es gibt kein solches Substrat; es gibt
kein Sein" hinter dem Tun, Wirken, Werden;
der Tftter " ist zum Tun "bloss hinzugedichtet
—das Tun ist alles.^l
Was aber wirklich, was wahr ist, ist weder
eins, noch auch nur reduzierbar auf eins.52
Diese Menschheits sie ist eine unldsbare
Vielheit von auf steigenden und nieder-
steigenden Lebensprozessen. 53
Phenomenal and metaphysical reality. In the
light of the preceding paragraphs it is not surprising
that ITietzsche calls the distinction bet-reen phenomenal
and metaphji-sical reality a symptom of decaying life
("ein SyTiiptom niedergehenden Lebens").^^ The idea of
an inaccessible and unknowable world is worthless
because it would make no difference to anyone.
Denn man kflnnte von der metaph3''si schen
Welt gar nichts aussagen als ein Anderssein,
ein uns unzug^ngliches, unbegreifliches
Anderssein; es wftre ein Ding mit negativen
Eigenschaften.—7/ftre die Sxistenz einer
solchen Welt noch so gut bewiesen, so
sttlnde doch fest, dass die gleichgftltigste
aller Erkenntnisse eben ihre Erkenntnis
ware: noch gleichgflltiger als dem Schiffer
in Sturmesgefahr die Erkenntnis von der
cheraischen Analysis des 7/'assers sein muss.^^
Der Gegensa.tz der scheinbaren Welt und
der wahren Welt reduziert sich auf den









Everything is active. One thing influences the
other, Nothing exists in isolation. Consequently
there ca,nnot he a thing in itself, nor can there he
things in themselves.
Die Eigenschaften eines Dinges sind
Wirkungen auf and re Binge": denkt man
andre Dinge" weg, so hat ein Ding keine
Eigenschaften, das heisst, es gi'bt kein
Ding ohne andre Dinge, das heisst, es
giht kein „ Ding an sich",57
Der Gegensatz „ Ding an sich" und
tfErscheinung** ist unhalthar; damit aher
fflllt auch der Begriff „ Erscheinung"
dahin.58
Sowenig „ Ding an sich", sowenig ist
„ Erkenntnis an sich" noch erlauht als
Begriff .59
Mechanism and teleology, '^''e are mistaken if we
believe that hy means of the sequence of cause and
effect we can reach into the essence of reality.
Since reality is of the nature of will, the presuppo-
sitions of mechanism are entirely fictitious. There
is no matter, no atom, no heaviness, no pressure,
and no push in reality. These ideas are psychological
interpretations. Necessity is not a matter of fact,






the flux of iDeing as a whole ^'e should have to reject
the idea of causal determination completely.
Eine tiefsinnige Wahnvorstellung. ,
,
j ener
unerschtttterliche Glauhe, dass das Denken,
an dem Leitfaden der Kausalitat, his in
die tiefsten Ahgrflnde des Seins reiche,
und dass das Denken das Sein nicht nur zu
erkennen, sondem sogar zu korrigieren
imstande sei,60
Alle Voraussetzungen des Mechanismus,
Stoff, Atom, Schwere, Bruck und Stoss
sind nicht Tatsachen an sich'*, sondem
Interpret ationen rait Hilfe psychischer
Fiktionen.61
Die mechanische Fotwendigkeit *• ist
kein Tathestand: wir erst hahen sie in das
Geschehen hineininterpretiert . Wir haben
die Forraulierharkeit des Geschehens aus-
gedeutet als Folge einer flher dem
Geschehen waltenden Fezessitat . 62
Die eherne Notwendigkeit ist ein Ding,
von dem die Menschen im Verlauf der Geschichte
einsehen, dass es weder ehem noch notwendig
ist. 63
Ein Intellekt, der Ursache und \7irkung
als continuum, nicht nach unserer Art als
willkflrliches Zerteilt- und Zerstflckt- sein,
sfthe, der den Fluss des Geschehens sfthe,
—wflrde den Begriff Ursache und Wirkung










Soweit es Gesetze in der Geschichte gitt,
sind die Gesetze nichts wert und ist die
Geschichte nichts wert.65
On the other hand, Fietzsche also rejects teleology
"because he means "by it a purposive planing on the part
of God, For him God is merely the world in the process
of its evolution. God is activity or will. It depends
on man to give to this world order, organization, form,
beauty, and wisdom. God depends on man and not man on
God. That is the essence of Nietzsche's metaphysics of
art.
Der Gesarat-Gharakt er der Welt ist dagegen
in alle Ev/igkeit Chaos, nicht ira Sinne der
fehlenden llotwend igkeit , sondem der fehlenden
Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, SchiJnheit, 'Veisheit,
und v;ie alle unsere tsthetischen Ilenschlich-
keiten heissen.66
Es ist das TTngliSlck der T^tigen, dass ihre
Tfttigkeit fast iramer ein wenig unverntflnftig
ist, Man darf zura Bei spiel hei dem geld-
sammelnden Bankier nach dera Zveck seiner
rastlosen TSLtigkeit nicht fragen: sie ist
unvernflnftig. Vie Tatigen rollen, wie der






3. THE RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION
Kant TTietzsche
1. The understanding
creates the T^'orld of the
objects of the senses.
2. Asserts the primacy
of the practical reason.
3. Experience is not an
aggregate of isolated
hi ts.
4. Categories are laws
without which experience
would not he possible.
5. Employed the analyti-
cal method more than the
synthetic,
6. Insisted on the fac-
tor of sense in knowledge.
1, The intellect creates its
ov.Ti appearances.
2. Disliked mere abstract
thought
.
3. Experience is a continuous
stream.
4. Categories are means to
help us control reality.
5. Started with the fact of
value and employed the
sjmoptic method.
6, Preferred artists to
philosophers because they
did not lose their senses.
7, The self as subject
is to be distinguished
from the self as object,
but could not explain it.
8, Distinguished between
phenomena and things in
themselves.
9, Limitations of
knowledge are set by
reason
.
7. Convictions are merely
petrified opinions v/hich
come from passions and
mental laziness,
8. Rejected the whole
concept of the thing in
itself.
9. Limitations of knowledge
are set by our own mind
.
10. Reason belongs as a
practice^l faculty to the
world of the free will.
10. Reason is inherent in
the will to power.
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11. Accepted a su^bstratum
in order to satisfy the need
for identitjr and permanence.
12. Freedom is the power
of a person to determine his
acts by means of reason.
13. Te cannot know reality
"by sense perception, but we
can think it.
14, Absolute necessity is
the veritable abyss for the
human reason,
15. Ilechanism is instrumen-
tal to teleology, '^he
teleological interpretation
is an inevitable attitude of
reason.
16. God, freedom, and
immortality'- are necessary
•nostulates of prac t X cal
reason. ^Yithout them the
mind would lose itself in
inner contradiction.
11. Rejected the idea of
a substratum a.nd was satis-
fied with the identity of
his ovm mind.
12. Freedom is the power
to say no.
13. We know the real v/orld
by our senses as well as by
our minds. The existence
of an unknowable metaphysical
reality would make no
difference to anj^one,
14. There is no necessity
in the world nor in history.
15. The presuppositions of
mechanism are entirely
fictitious. The sequence of
cause and effect does not
lead to reality. The teleolo-
gical interpretation of
nature is wrong.
16. The will to power is
fundamental. All processes
are derived from it. It is
only a question of weak or
strong v>rill. There is no
absolute standard of truth.




In the introduction of this chapter metaphysics
was defined as the attempt to give a coherent and
rational interpretation of the unified and total
meaning of the facts of our experience. This is now
the place to decide who gave us the better interpretation
of the v;orld as we know it, Kant or Hietzsche.
Kant \vas a slow "but sjrstematic thinker. His
thoughts reflected the gradual development of reason
and its work of making order out of chaos. Although
his employment of the a.nalytical method and his
adherence to the old soul- substance theory led to
the unfortunate distinction "between phenomenal and
metaphysical, Kant tried to correct it by emphasizing
the practical reason. As a causa noumenon man is
free and capable of achieving his true worth, if not
here then in the life hereafter. It is as a member
of the world of thought that man can think reality and
arrange his life accordingly. In spite of being unable
to cope v:ith the problem of evil Kant built up a per-
spective of rational striving that finds its true
realization in God as the highest perfection.

ITietzsche did not succeed so well as Kant in
making order out of chaos. His explanation of the
facts was lacking in organization. Since he did not
believe in an a"bsolute standard of truth, ITietzsche's
philosophy was sometimes untrue to life as a whole.
He overemphasized the biological side of man and
lingered all too much on the will to power. Evil is
justified in the economy of the whole, and the
importance of God is not brought out. Everything
depends on the quality of man in action. Yet
Nietzsche's synthetic method with its emphasis on
values is to be preferred to that of Kant's analjrsis.
However, his principles of excellence, efficiency,
prominence, mastery a.nd control, although very
essential aspects of life, are not so important as
the love of God which alone can be the rational
explanation and meaning of life. The competitive
theory of Nietzsche drives us on, but does not tell
us for what ultimate purpose. The drive for control
and power is no ultimate solution for rational beings.




for "building our personality, but why should we engage
in this task unless it "be true that God. is love and




The problem of this dissertation was to
determine whether ITiet zsche' s accusations against
Kant were Justified and whether there are any spiritual
relations between these two philosophers.
Ethics. ICant put an end to one-sided
intellectualism "by making the free and rational will
of man the only basis for morality. There is nothing
that can be called good except a good will. It is
necessar3'" that the will obey the commands of reason,
without regard for consequences. Duty must be done
for duty's sake. We stand under a discipline of
reason which makes us despise tender-hea.rted S3nnpathy.
Strive to be worthy of happiness I Immortality is
necessary in order that happiness may be proportioned
according to worthiness.
ITietzsche treated moralitjr as an expression of
the will to power. The moral person does not seek his
happiness, he seeks his work. Good, is synonjrmous with




motivated "by the furthest ideal. V/e ought to live this
life as if it vjere our eternal life.
Kant and Nietzsche agree on the following
principles: (1) morality is essentially a matter of
the free v/ill; (2) moral laxrs must "be consistently
obeyed regardless of consequences; (3) conscience
should be the voice of reason; (4) self-respect
should precede altruism; (5) sympathy should he
exhibited only sparingly; (6) there is a striking
resemblance between Kant*s categorical imperative,
"Act as if the maxim of thy action were by thy will
to become the universal law of nature" and Fietzsche's
principle that we ought to live this life in such a
way as to be willing to live it over and over again.
ITietzsche differs from Kant on these essential
points: (1) he distinguishes between slave and ma.ster
morality; (2) he considers humanity as a means to the
production of superior men; (3) he gives more emphasis
to consequences in judging moral acts: (4) he is more
concerned with wholesome love of one's self.
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Politics. The central element of Kant*s political
philosophy is the concept of freedom within the laws of
the state. Censorship and forbidding of criticism will
result in injury to intellectual progress. The state
should represent the interests of all. All actions are
wrong if they are not corapatihle with publicity. It is
the duty of the representatives of the people to bring
the constitution into conformity with reason. Mankind
is steadily progressing. A federation of nations will
be the final solution of the international problem.
The chief emphasis in llietzsche' s political
philosophy is upon the fact that if a government
cannot develop sufficient nobility of cha,racter in
its leadership it is doomed to failure. If one
glorifies the state and weakens the power of the
individual, the original purpose of the state will
be frustrated. In an efficient aristocracy the
success of those who are wisest mentally and strongest
physically would be guaranteed. TTarrow racialism and
blind nationalism stand in the v;ay of a united Europe.
Kant and TTietzsche would agree that strong and




If a state is largely ruled "by the vulgar and cornmon-
place it "-vill perish from the very complexity and
difficulties of its prololems. Social changes must
proceed in accordance xvith existing and amendable
laws. The final product of political activity should
"be a union of nations.
Aesthetics, For Kant the beautiful is an object
of disinterested pleasure. It is perceived without
any accompanying conception of an end to which it is
adapted. Artistic talent is therefore a natural
force vjhich creates purposively, yet without design
or concepts.
For Fietzsche "beaut}'' is an expression of power.
Its purpose is to counteract decadence and to create
an endless perspective of the possibilities of
achievement. Genius is productive vitality,
V/hile Kant's aesthetics is mostly an appreciation
of nature, TTietzsche' s philosophy of art is intended
to overcome pessimism and weakness. It is the
emphasis on purpose that has made Fietzsche one of




poetry, "but music is the direct expression of the v/ill
to power.
Religion. Kant held that everything in the vjorld
points to a world architect, hut not to a creator.
The truth of any religious life is to he measured hy
its harmony with the moral law. Jesus may he called
the Son of God, hecause his life was an expression of
the divine will. The greatest handicap to religious
progress is the radical evil in us which is not a
natural endovvrraent, hut a free act that corrupts the
source of all principles,
jTietzsche is convinced that helief in God is
essential to the health of a nation. God may he
either the will to power, or the original artist of
the v7orld, or the universe in the course of its
evolution. Religion is a. way of life. Sin is a
Jewish invention. The economy of the whole justifies
the existence of evil. It is the sign of all great
religions to overcome epidemics of inertia and lack
of vitality.
TThile Kant is completely unahle to cope v;ith the
prohlem of evil, TTietzsche takes it as a challenge.
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Starting -^ith the unity of the person, Fietzsche's
evaluation of religion is more empirical than Kant's.
However, he fails to realize tlie need for redemption.
He tenets to overemphasize man*s independence, whereas
Kant stresses the importance of Grod's aid "beyond the
limits of men* s power.
Iletaphysics. Kant's thoughts reflected the
gradual development of reason and its vrork of making
order out of chaos. Although his employment of the
analjrtlcal method and his adherence to the old soul-
suhstance theory led to the unfortunate distinction
between phenomenal and metaphysical, Kant tried to
correct it "by emphasizing the practical reason. As
a causa noumenon man is free e.nr' capahle of achieving
his true worth, if not here then in the life hereafter.
It is as a memher of the world of thought that man can
think reality and arrange his life accord inf^ly. In
spite of heing unahle to cope with the problem of evil
Kant "built up a per spective of rational striving that
finds its true realization in God as the hif^hest
perfection.
ITietzsche did not succeed so well as Kant in




facts Tvas lacking in organization. Since he did not
believe in an absolute standard of truth, '"ietzsche ' s
philosophy was sometimes untrue to life as a whole.
He overemphasized the 'biological side of nan and
lingered all too much on the 'vill to power, Svil is
justified in the economy of the whole, and the
importance of God is not brought out. Everything
depends on the quality of man in action. Yet ITietzsche'
s
synthetic method v/ith its emphasis on values is to be
preferred to that of Kant^s analysis. However, his
principles of excellence, efficiency, prominence,
mastery and control, although very essential aspects
of life, are not so important as the love of God
v/hich alone can be the rational explanation and
meaning of life. The competitive theor3'' of ITietzsche
drives us on, but does not tell us for what ultimate
purpose. The drive for control and power is no
final solution for rational beings. The hard prospect
of eternal recurrence may be needed for building our
personality, but why should we engage in this task
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The problem of this dissertation was to determine whether Nietzsche's
accusations against Kant were justified and whether there are any relations
between their philosophies.
THE MORAL CONCEPTIONS OF KANT AND NIETZSCHE
The moral conception of Kant. The free and rational will of man is the
only basis for morality. There is nothing that can be called good except a
good will. It is necessary that the will obey the commands of reason, without
regard for consequences. Duty must be done for duty's sake. We stand under
a discipline of reason which makes us despise tenderhearted sympathy. Strive
to be worthy of happiness! Immortality is necessary in order that happiness
may be proportioned according to worthiness.
The moral conceptions of J^ietzsche. Morality is an expression of the will
to power. The moral person does not seek his happiness, he seeks his work.
Good is synonymous with bravery, power, and control. Every act ought to be
motivated by the furthest ideal. We ought to live this life as if it were our
eternal life.
Conclusions. Kant and Nietzsche agree on the following principles: (1)
morality is essentially a matter of the free will; (2) moral laws must be con'
sistently obeyed regardless of consequences; (3) conscience should be the voice
of reason; (4) self-respect should precede altruism; (5) sympathy should be
exhibited only sparingly; (6) there is a striking resemblance between Kant's
categorical imperative, "Act as if the maxim of thy action were by thy will
to become a universal law of nature" and Nietzsche's principle that we ought
to live this life in such a way as to be willing to live it over and over again.
Nietzsche differs from Kant on these essential points: (1) he distinguishes
between slave and master morality; (2) he considers humanity as a means to
the production of superior men; (3) he gives more emphasis to consequences
in judging moral acts; (4) he is more concerned with wholesome love of
one's self.
THE POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS OF KANT AND NIETZSCHE
The political conceptions of Kant. The central element of Kant's political
philosophy is the concept of freedom within the laws of the state. Censorship
and forbidding of criticism will result in injury to intellectual progress. The
state should represent the interests of all. All actions are wrong if they are
not compatible with publicity. It is the duty of the representatives of the
people to bring the constitution into conformity with reason. Mankind is
steadily progressing. A federation of nations will be the final solution of the
international problem.
The political conceptions of 7<lietzsche. The chief emphasis in Nietzsche's
political philosophy is upon the fact that if a government cannot develop
sufiicient nobility of character in its leadership it is doomed to failure. If one
glorifies the state and weakens the power of the individual, the original purpose
of the state will be frustrated. In an efficient aristocracy the success of those
who are wisest mentally and strongest physically would he guaranteed. Nor-
row racialism and blind nationalism stand in the way of a united Europe.
Conclusions. Kant and Nietzsche would agree that strong and superior
leaders are needed in an ideal government. If a state is largely ruled by the
vulgar and commonplace it will perish from the very complexity and difficulties
of its problems. Social changes must proceed in accordance with existing and
amendable laws. The final product of political activity should be a union of
nations.
THE AESTHETIC CONCEPTIONS OF KANT AND NIETZSCHE
The aesthetic conceptions of Kant. For Kant the beautiful is an object of
disinterested pleasure. It is perceived without any accompanying conception
of an end to which it is adapted Artistic talent is therefore a natural force
which creates purposively, yet without design or concepts.
The aesthetic conceptions of 7<[ietzsche. For Nietzsche beauty is an ex'
pression of power. Its purpose is to counteract decadence and to create an
endless perspective of the possibilities of achievement. Genius is productive
vitality.
Conclusions. While Kant's aesthetics is mostly an appreciation of nature,
Nietzsche's philosophy of art is intended to overcome pessimism and weakness.
It is the emphasis on purpose that has made Nietzsche one of the outstanding
critics and promoters of art. Not poetry, but music is the direct expression of
the will to power.
THE RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF KANT AND NIETZSCHE
The religious conceptions of Kant. Everything in the world points to a
divine architect, but not to a creator. The truth of any religious life is to be
measured by its harmony with the moral law. Jesus may be called the Son of
God, because his life was an expression of the divine will. The greatest
handicap to religious progress is the radical evil in us which is not a natural
endowment, but a free act that corrupts the source of all principles.
The religious conceptions of 7<[ietzsche. Nietzsche is convinced that belief
in God is essential to the health of a nation. God may be either the will to
power, or the universe in the course of its evolution, or the original artist of
the world. Religion is a way of life. Sin is a Jewish invention. The economy
of the whole justifies the existence of evil. It is the sign of all great religions
to overcome epidemics of inertia and lack of vitality.
Conclusions. While Kant is completely unable to cope with the problem
of evil, Nietzsche takes it as a challenge. Starting with the unity of the
person, Nietzsche's evaluation of religion is more empirical than Kant's. How-
ever, he fails to realize the need of redemption. He tends to overemphasize
man's independence, whereas Kant stresses the importance of God's aid beyond
the limits of man's power.
THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF KANT AND NIETZSCHE
The metaphysical conceptions of Kant. Kant's thoughts reflected the
gradual development of reason and its work of making order out of chaos.
Although his employment of the analytical method and his adherence to the
old soul'substance theory led tx> the unfortunate distinction between phenom'
enal and metaphysical reality, Kant tried to correct it by emphasizing the
practical reason. As a causa noumenon man is free and capable of achieving
his true worth, if not here then in the life herefter. It is as a member of thi;
world of thought that man can think reality and arrange his life accordingly.
In spite of being unable to cope with the problem of evil Kant built up a
perspective of rational striving that finds its true realization in God as the
highest perfection.
The meULphysical conceptions of J^ietzsche. Nietzsche did not succeed so
well as Kant in making order out of chaos. His explanation of the facts was
lacking in organization. Since he did not believe in an absolute standard of
truth, Nietzsche's philosophy was sometimes untrue to life as a whole. He
overemphasized the biological side of man and lingered all too much on the
will to power. Evil is justified in the economy of the whole, and the im-
portance of God is not brought out. Everything depends on the quality of
man in action. Yet Nietzsche's synthetic method with its emphasis on values
is to be preferred to that of Kant's analysis. However, his principles of
excellence, efiiciency, prominence, mastery and control, although very essential
aspects of life, are not so important as the love of God which alone can be
the rational explanation and meaning of life. The competitive theory of
Nietzsche drives us on, but does not tell us for what ultimate purpose. The
drive for control and power is no final solution for rational beings. The hard
prospect of eternal recurrence may be needed for building our personality, but
why should we engage in this task unless it be true that God is love and thus
a conserver of values?
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